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Standard operating procedures (SOPs) guide emergency responders in a crisis, 
providing predetermined steps to manage anticipated events. Modern disasters, however, 
often manifest as complex systems—susceptible to nonlinear interactions and feedback in 
the environment that produce unanticipated outcomes. As a consequence, the application 
of prediction-dependent SOPs to such prediction-defiant scenarios yields ineffective 
emergency management. In contrast, case studies suggest that crisis responses 
demonstrating adaptable behavior often succeed in a complex environment. If 
adaptability mitigates complex problems, then modern crisis SOPs should embrace an 
adaptive approach.  
This thesis proposes two practical, executable means of integrating adaptability 
into SOP-driven crisis response. Both options rely on current research in complex 
adaptive systems theory and a pragmatic application of the Socratic method. The first 
proposal is the incorporation of adaptability prompts into pre-existing crisis SOPs. These 
prompts are instructional steps that help emergency responders identify unanticipated 
behavior during complex events and adjust their crisis response plans accordingly. The 
second proposal recommends the creation of a crisis co-pilot, an ad hoc advisor who 
helps the lead emergency responder identify any divergence from predicted behavior and 
encourages adaptation in the field. To support these policy recommendations, this thesis 
also presents a computer simulation of air traffic controller responses during the 9/11 
attacks, quantifying hypothetical improvements in response times attained by 
implementing the adaptive design proposals.  
Today’s emergency response paradigm must acclimate to the unpredictable nature 
of complex environments. This thesis recommends operational modifications that 
promote adaptability to manage complex crises. 
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The nature of disasters has evolved, but emergency management has not kept 
pace with the change. Today’s crisis environment is subject to countless influences—a 
product of our globalized, complex society—which produce random and volatile events. 
Despite the unpredictability of modern disasters, the Homeland Security Enterprise still 
adheres to prediction-dependent standard operating procedures (SOPs) to guide 
emergency response. As a result, police, firefighters, and other crisis professionals are 
less able to manage complex crises. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Professional crisis responders perform their duties using four essential tools: 
professional training, job-specific technology, accumulated work experience, and SOPs.1 
The SOP anticipates the operating environment and provides a checklist of recommended 
actions to accomplish an objective. Sociologists Charles Parker and Eric Stern claim, 
“SOPs are based on past experience and expectation.”2 As long as the actual event 
adheres to the prediction, personnel can rely on the SOP to impart relevant guidance. 
However, when reality diverges from the anticipated scenario, SOP guidance becomes 
less useful.  
Beginning in the late twentieth century, the global community experienced 
tremendous improvements in telecommunications and information sharing, allowing 
agents within this worldwide system to interact with and exert unprecedented influence 
on each other. This significant increase in connectivity and feedback intensified the 
complexity of many social systems. Sociologists David Snowden and Mary Boone 
describe complexity as the behavior of large numbers of agents dynamically reacting to 
                                                 
1 The author bases this statement on 18 years of experience in federal law enforcement as both a 
criminal investigator and an emergency medical technician. 
2 Charles F. Parker and Eric K. Stern, “Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of Strategic 
Surprise,” Political Psychology 23, no. 3 (2002): 615, doi: 10.111/0162-895X.00300. 
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and influencing each other within a bounded system.3 One of the essential characteristics 
of complexity is that behavioral outcomes often prove non-intuitive and difficult to 
predict. Modern disasters can also demonstrate complex characteristics, erupting quickly 
and evolving in unexpected ways.  
Modern crises often demonstrate the prediction-defiant characteristics of 
complexity. To examine these unpredictable characteristics and assess the utility of SOP-
driven crisis response vis-à-vis adaptive behavior, this thesis explores three modern crises 
that demonstrated complex characteristics: the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and the 
Tohoku Tsunami/Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear incident. Each of these events exhibited 
complex characteristics and affords the opportunity to assess both SOP-driven and 
adaptive responses.  
The case studies consistently showed that SOPs provided inadequate guidance in 
these crises while adaptive approaches would have been more effective in the complex 
environments in which the crises occurred. When the actual disasters deviated from the 
prediction, emergency responders found themselves adhering to irrelevant procedures. 
For instance, as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) attempted to follow a 
hijacking SOP, its officers failed to recognize that the event had become a terror attack. 
Alternatively, the U.S. Coast Guard successfully supported the maritime evacuation of 
Manhattan during the 9/11 attacks by consciously departing from SOP guidance. While 
instances of adaptable behavior did not significantly mitigate these crises, they serve to 
illustrate the advantages of adaptive behavior approaches over rote, SOP-driven 
responses in the complex environment. 
B. THE ADAPTIVE DESIGN PROPOSALS 
The fundamental weakness in SOP guidance for complex crises is its static 
approach to a variable environment. To mitigate this vulnerability, SOP-driven crisis 
response must pivot to embrace an adaptive posture. Toward that end, the thesis 
recommends two methods to integrate adaptability into SOP-driven crisis response. 
                                                 
3 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review 85, no. 11 (2007). 
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These proposals make use of contemporary research into complex adaptive systems 
(CAS) theory and a practical application of the Socratic method to the emergency 
response paradigm.  
Louise Comfort et al. describe the essential nature of CAS as “the spontaneous 
reallocation of energy and action to achieve a collective goal in a changing 
environment.”4 Essentially, CAS describes the adaptive behavior that agents must 
demonstrate to achieve their objectives within a complex system. The ability to engage in 
flexible, dynamic responses to unexpected deviations is necessary, particularly when 
navigating the hazardous environment of a complex disaster. Similarly, Mary Uhl-Bien, 
Russ Marion, and Bill McKelvey contend that emergency responders must function as a 
CAS, following a course dictated by a dynamic interaction with the environment rather 
than by bureaucratic protocols.5   
The Socratic method is a particularly relevant tool for emergency response in a 
complex crisis as it promotes an active search for knowledge to achieve comprehension. 
Its emphasis on challenging assumptions and re-evaluating a problem prepares 
emergency responders to expect an evolving scenario. Therefore, it is an ideal foundation 
to develop a dynamic process for succeeding in a complex environment.  
The first proposal is the incorporation of adaptability prompts into pre-existing 
crisis SOPs. Based on the Socratic method, these prompts urge emergency responders to 
challenge their assumptions about the crisis event and continually seek a better way to 
achieve their objectives. These instructional steps help identify unanticipated events or 
behaviors in the field and adjust the crisis response plans accordingly. The proposal of 
adaptability prompts is a simple upgrade to pre-existing SOPs that urges awareness of 
complexity and promotes adaptive behavior. 
                                                 
4 Louise K. Comfort et al., “Complex Systems in Crisis: Anticipation and Resilience in Dynamic 
Environments,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 9, no. 3 (2001): 146. 
5 Mary Uhl-Bien, Russ Marion, and Bill McKelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting 
Leadership from the Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era,” The Leadership Quarterly 18, no. 4 (2007). 
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Patrick Lagadec and Benjamin Topper recommend the provision of cognitive 
assistance during an emergency.6 Their analysis suggests that leading emergency 
response actions in the field while constantly evaluating the crisis environment is a task 
that may exceed the capacity of a single crisis professional. To accommodate this 
dilemma, the second proposal recommends the creation of a crisis co-pilot, an ad hoc 
advisor who helps the lead emergency responder identify any divergence from predicted 
behavior and encourages adaptation in the field. Essentially, the crisis co-pilot assists the 
lead emergency responder in adhering to the Socratic tenets recommended by the 
adaptability prompts, reminding him to challenge initial expectations in the crisis 
scenario and adapt the operational plan to accommodate the unexpected.  
C. A COMPUTER SIMULATION TO SUPPORT THE ADAPTIVE DESIGN 
PROPOSALS 
A multi-agent computer simulation is a framework for approximating human 
decisions within a virtual system to identify the best means for a desired outcome. The 
computer simulation cannot represent every nuance in human behavior or unpredicted 
influences in a complex system, so experimental conclusions appear as “if/then” 
statements rather than concrete assertions. While these results are only hypothetical, they 
can effectively promote or denigrate a policy proposal by quantifying and depicting its 
potential value. To illustrate the potential benefit of the adaptive design proposals, the 
thesis presents a computer simulation based on the FAA response on the morning of 
September 11.  
The simulation experiment approximated the hypothetical value of the adaptive 
design proposals by incrementally increasing the FAA’s ability to detect the first hijacked 
airliner on 9/11 as a threat. The goal of this experiment—the point at which the adaptive 
design proposals achieve a meaningful improvement in the scenario outcome—was to 
prompt the order to launch alert fighters in time to intercept the second hijacked airliner 
before it struck the World Trade Center. The outcome of the experiment suggests that if 
the adaptive design proposals yielded a 25 percent improvement in FAA threat detection, 
                                                 
6 Patrick Lagadec and Benjamin Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” Journal of Risk 
Analysis and Crisis Response 2, no. 1 (2012): 28. 
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the fighters could have intercepted the second airliner. These results, therefore, may be 
more broadly construed to indicate that the adaptive design proposals could yield a 
significant benefit to the field of crisis response. 
D. CONCLUSION 
While ineffective SOPs do not presuppose the failure of emergency responders in 
every complex event—the quality of their experience and technology arguably 
overshadows the shortfalls of these static guidelines—they remain a flawed yet fixable 
problem within the emergency response field. As such, this thesis proposed two 
executable methods to integrate adaptability into SOP-driven emergency response. By 
incorporating adaptability prompts into crisis SOPs and instituting the role of a crisis co-
pilot, response agencies can more effectively manage complex emergencies. Further, by 
implementing these steps to integrate adaptability into standardized emergency response, 
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The nature of disasters has evolved, but emergency management has not kept 
pace with the change. Today’s crisis environment is subject to countless influences—a 
product of our globalized, complex society—which produce random and volatile events. 
Despite the unpredictability of today’s crisis arena, the Homeland Security Enterprise 
(HSE) still adheres to prediction-dependent standard operating procedures (SOPs) to 
guide emergency response. As a result, police, firefighters, and other crisis professionals 
are less able to manage modern, unpredictable events.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Professional crisis responders perform their duties using four essential tools: 
professional training, job-specific technology, accumulated work experience, and SOPs.1 
The SOP anticipates the operating environment and provides a checklist of recommended 
actions to accomplish an objective. Sociologists Charles Parker and Eric Stern claim, 
“SOPs are based on past experience and expectation.”2 As long as the actual event 
adheres to the prediction, personnel can rely on the SOP to impart relevant guidance. 
However, when reality diverges from the anticipated scenario, crisis professionals find 
that SOP direction becomes less useful.  
Beginning in the late twentieth century, the global community experienced 
tremendous improvements in telecommunications and information sharing, allowing 
agents within this worldwide system to interact with and exert unprecedented influence 
on each other. This significant increase in connectivity and feedback increased the 
complexity of many social systems. Sociologists David Snowden and Mary Boone 
describe complexity as a way of understanding the behavior of large numbers of agents 
                                                 
1 The author bases this statement on 18 years of experience in federal law enforcement as both a 
criminal investigator and an emergency medical technician. 
2 Charles F. Parker and Eric K. Stern, “Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of Strategic 
Surprise,” Political Psychology 23, no. 3 (2002): 615, doi: 10.111/0162-895X.00300. 
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dynamically reacting to and influencing each other within a bounded system.3 One of the 
essential characteristics of complexity is that behavioral outcomes often prove non-
intuitive and difficult to predict. Modern disasters can also demonstrate complex 
characteristics, erupting quickly and evolving in unexpected ways.  
If SOPs are designed to respond primarily to predictable scenarios, their value is 
diminished when mitigating complex disasters with unpredictable outcomes. This is a 
dilemma with which present-day crisis professionals must contend in the field. This 
thesis addresses how to integrate adaptability into SOPs to improve their value as tools 
for mitigating complex disasters. The research and analysis should yield executable 
solutions with which HSE policy makers can upgrade traditional SOPs to promote 
adaptability, thereby allowing more effective emergency responses in the age of 
complexity.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can we integrate adaptability into standard operating 
procedures?  
The thesis recommends two potential solutions to the issues presented in the 
problem statement. These proposals depend on the argument that success in a complex 
environment requires adaptability. Therefore, successful emergency response in a 
complex disaster requires an adaptive approach. This work explores the feasibility and 
methods policy makers within the HSE can use to incorporate adaptability into the 
traditionally static SOP model. To develop the adaptive modification proposals for the 
crisis SOP, this thesis makes use of contemporary research into complex adaptive 
systems theory and a practical application of the Socratic method to the emergency 
response paradigm.  
 
                                                 
3 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review 85, no. 11 (2007). 
 3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research presented in this work illustrates the diminished value of prediction-
dependent SOPs in complex crises and proposes redesigning the SOP model by 
integrating adaptability into the emergency response process. Very little literature 
explores the effectiveness of crisis response SOPs in complex environments. Therefore, it 
was necessary to conduct research to develop and evaluate this notional problem across a 
broad range of topics, from complexity theory to the origin and evolution of SOPs, to 
empirical and analytical assessments of modern, complex disasters. The following pages 
discuss the key resources used to define the problem as well as to develop and evaluate a 
proposed solution for addressing the limited value of prediction-dependent SOPs in 
complex crises.  
1. The Era of Complexity 
There is an abundance of literature on the increase of complexity in today’s 
environment. Leadership experts Mary Uhl-Bien, Russ Marion, and Bill McKelvey 
provide significant insight into the evolution of complexity in the modern era. They argue 
that prior to the technological revolution, organizational relationships tended toward 
linear connections, thereby limiting the influence that human and non-human elements 
within a system exerted on each other.4 While these systems could have many connected 
agents, their relationships were straightforward and predictable. This type of environment 
is known as a complicated system. 
In contrast, a complex system comprises agents who influence each other in a 
nonlinear or random fashion, making the outcome of their interactions far less 
predictable. Recent technological improvements have created a new era of high-velocity 
communication, interdependent infrastructures, and immediate data access. These global 
networks allow agents from around the world to influence each other in diverse ways, 
establishing the unpredictable characteristics of complexity in the modern environment.5 
                                                 
4 Mary Uhl-Bien, Russ Marion, and Bill McKelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting 
Leadership from the Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era,” The Leadership Quarterly 18, no. 4 (2007). 
5 Ibid. 
 4 
The works of Snowden and Boone, as well as General Stanley McChrystal et al., 
describe the significant influence of elements interacting within an environment. 
Snowden and Boone developed the Cynefin Framework, a classification system that 
defines the nature of an environment as ordered, unordered, or disordered.6 Further, their 
framework depicts the contrasting characteristics of the linear, predictable complicated 
system against the nonlinear, unpredictable complex system. McChrystal et al. discuss 
the challenges of decision making in a complex crisis environment, as they analyze the 
successes and failures of the military campaign against al Qaeda in Iraq.7 
2. The Standard Operating Procedure 
Such peer-reviewed works as Michael Gunther’s “Auftragstaktik: The Basis for 
Modern Military Command?” identify the origins of the formalized SOP in nineteenth 
century Germany.8 Von Moltke designed the original SOP for an ordered, linear 
environment, and the tenets of his methodology were also successfully applied on the 
factory production floor during the Industrial Age. Robert Kanigel’s article on Frederick 
Winslow Taylor and the industrial efficiency movement provides an example of how an 
ordered, predictable environment is the optimal setting for the SOP model.9  
Businesses that operate in complex environments are subject to many diverse 
influences, some harmful and some helpful. There is significant research material 
available on the modern business approach to globalized vulnerabilities. Economists Ila 
Manuj and John Mentzer discuss the impact of complexity on the global marketplace.10 
They argue that successful modern companies take advantage of the dynamic business 
opportunities created by the complex domain’s interconnectivity and globalization. 
                                                 
6 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 68–77. 
7 Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (London: 
Penguin, 2015). 
8 Michael J. Gunther, “Auftragstaktik: The Basis for Modern Military Command?” (Monograph, 
School for Advanced Military Studies, 2012). 
9 Robert Kanigel, “Taylor‐made,” The Sciences 37, no. 3 (1997): 19, doi: 10.1002/j.2326-
1951.tb03309.x. 
10 Ila Manuj and John T. Mentzer, “Global Supply Chain Risk Management,” Journal of Business 
Logistics 29, no. 1 (2008): 133, doi: 10.1002/j.2158-1592.2008.tb00072.x. 
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Additionally, the Publications Office of the European Union defines the interdependence 
and connectivity between lines of programming code in a computer application. An 
effective SOP must accommodate the elements of complexity in the implementation of 
any software upgrade.11  
There is considerable material on modern crisis-response SOPs, varying from 
non-specific guidelines to specific checklist-style examples. The checklist protocol for 
police officers responding to an active shooter sharply contrasts with the modern business 
SOP; the police model fails to acknowledge the likelihood of unanticipated influences in 
the scenario. Instead, the police example assumes that active shooters behave in 
predictable ways. Psychologist Daniel Kahneman provides an interesting counterpoint to 
the suggested problem caused by ineffective SOPs. He theorizes that the “everyday” 
experience of emergency responders refines their decision-making acumen to an 
instinctive level. This reflexive response enables some crisis professionals to react swiftly 
and effectively to unanticipated developments, despite ineffective SOP guidance.12 
Kahneman argues that a veteran crisis responder relies primarily on experience, rendering 
SOP guidance irrelevant. 
3. Case Studies—Complexity in Modern Crises 
To examine unpredictable characteristics in the modern crisis environment and 
assess the utility of SOP-driven crisis response compared to adaptive (i.e., non-SOP) 
behavior, this research explores case studies of three modern crises that demonstrated 
complex characteristics: the September 11 terror attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and the 
Fukushima-Dai’ichi nuclear disaster. Analysis of these mega-crises demonstrated the 
value of both SOP-driven actions and adaptive responses, and identified the reasons why 
these actions succeeded or failed in a complex crisis.  
                                                 
11 Publications Office of the European Union, Technical Environment and Standard Operating 
Procedures of the Publications Office: Annex 12, Version 3.1 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union: March 2012), 17, https://publications.europa.eu/documents/10530/676542/ao_10477_ 
annex_12_en.pdf. 
12 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Macmillan, 2011), 236–237. 
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a. September 11 Terror Attacks 
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks and the University of Maryland’s 
“Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later” provide objective descriptions of decision 
making and crisis response on the day of the attacks.13 Resource literature produced by 
James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf analyzes SOP-driven actions during the 
September 11 attacks.14 Kathleen Tierney’s research on behalf of the University of 
Delaware’s Disaster Research Center compares prediction-dependent responses to 
flexible, adaptive action during this crisis.15 
b. Hurricane Katrina 
The material produced by the U.S. House of Representatives furnishes an 
objective description of the Katrina disaster.16 Economists Russell Sobel and Peter 
Leeson contribute a unique analysis of crisis events, directly comparing the decentralized 
disaster responses during the September 11 attacks to the response after Hurricane 
Katrina.17 
c. Tohoku Tsunami and Fukushima-Dai’ichi Meltdown 
Articles written by Nobuhito Mori, Tomoyuki Takahashi, Tomohiro Yasuda, and 
Hideaki Yanagisawa provide synopses of the Fukushima-Dai’ichi disaster.18 Research 
                                                 
13 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Authorized Edition) 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 18; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, “Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later,” University of Maryland, 2011, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/announcements/BackgroundReport_ 
10YearsSince9_11.pdf. 
14 James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, “Creativity in Emergency Response to the World Trade 
Center Disaster” (Special Publication No. 39, University of Colorado, 2003), 127. 
15 Kathleen Tierney, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Organizational and Community Resilience: 
Lessons from the Emergency Response Following the September 11, 2001 Attack on the World Trade 
Center,” (Preliminary Paper #329, University of Delaware, 2003), 5. 
16 U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative:  The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2006). 
17 Russell S. Sobel and Peter T. Leeson, “Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Public 
Choice Analysis,” Public Choice 127, no. 1–2 (2006): 55–73. 
18 Nobuhito Mori et al., “Survey of 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Inundation and Run-up,” 
Geophysical Research Letters 38, no. 7 (2011). 
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scientists Okada Norio, Tao Ye, Yoshio Kajitani, Peijun Shi, and Hirokazu Tatano 
summarize the relative efficacy of SOP-driven responses during the disaster, providing 
both insightful analysis and significant technical detail.19 Additionally, analysis produced 
by Eliza Strickland on behalf of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
discusses the nuclear plant’s SOPs as well as the inherent value of the employees’ 
adaptive responses in the crisis.20 An article written by Robert Geller, Woody Epstein, 
and Johannis Noggerath explains the limitations of the nuclear plant’s SOPs and the 
associated crisis planning. 
4. Building the Adaptable SOP Model 
The works of Louise Comfort et al. and Mary Uhl-Bien et al. address the 
challenges of public management in complex environments, particularly in relation to 
natural or manmade disasters.21 The design concepts for the adaptable SOP model 
depend heavily on the dialectic principles of the Socratic method. This thesis relies 
significantly on the scholarly contributions of Linda Elder and Richard Paul as well as T. 
Rick Whiteley. Their published works discuss the methodology behind Socratic 
questioning, which forms a basis for the adaptive design proposals recommended in the 
thesis.22 Finally, material published by Patrick Lagadec and Benjamin Topper addresses 
the challenges of mitigating complex crises. The authors make the central claim that 
decision making in modern crisis response demands a paradigm shift toward adaptive, 
creative thinking to manage the attributes of complexity.23  
                                                 
19 Okada Norio et al., “The 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster: Overview and 
Comments,”  2, no. 1 (2011), http://link.springer.com/journal/13753. 
20 Eliza Strickland, “24 Hours at Fukushima: A Blow-by-Blow Account of the Worst Nuclear 
Accident Since Chernobyl,” IEEE Spectrum, October 31, 2011, http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-
hours-at-fukushima. 
21 Louise K. Comfort et al., “Complex Systems in Crisis: Anticipation and Resilience in Dynamic 
Environments,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 9, no. 3 (2001): 144–158; Uhl-Bien, 
Marion, and McKelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory.”  
22 Linda Elder and Richard Paul, “The Role of Socratic Questioning in Thinking, Teaching, and 
Learning,” The Clearing House 71, no. 5 (1998); T. Rick Whiteley, “Using the Socratic Method and 
Bloom’s Taxonomy of the Cognitive Domain to Enhance Online Discussion, Critical Thinking, and 
Student Learning,” Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning 33 (2014). 
23 Patrick Lagadec and Benjamin Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” Journal of Risk 
Analysis and Crisis Response 2, no. 1 (2012): 21–33. 
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5. Evaluating the Adaptable SOP 
There is a wealth of available literature on the value of running computer 
simulations to test policies and operational plans before implementing them. Susan 
Sanchez and Li An discuss the merits and design necessities of computer simulations. 
Sanchez speaks to the fundamental attributes of experimental design and its value in 
exploring environmental factors in simulation rather than real-time attempts through trial 
and error.24 Both authors describe methods to optimize the design and execution of 
computer simulation models.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
The goals of this research are to identify a vulnerability in the crisis-response 
application of SOPs in complex environments and recommend a method to resolve the 
deficiency. To accomplish these goals, this thesis focuses on three objectives: 1) to 
identify the problem, specifically the history and evolution of the SOP model and the 
characteristics and relevance of complexity in modern crises; 2) to assess the diminished 
value of prediction-dependent SOP guidance in complex emergencies; and 3) to construct 
and evaluate a more adaptive SOP design that policy makers can implement within the 
framework of existing emergency response SOPs. Ideally, this work will convince HSE 
leadership to enhance existing SOPs to address the unpredictability of complex 
emergency events. 
1. Selection of Resource Material 
To accomplish the stated objectives, this thesis relies on material obtained through 
open-source research as well as proprietary sources accessed via the Dudley Knox 
Library at the Naval Postgraduate School. The literature includes material from 
governmental documents and peer-reviewed articles and books. The thesis also makes 
                                                 
24 Susan M. Sanchez, “Work Smarter, Not Harder: Guidelines for Designing Simulation 
Experiments,” Proceedings of the 37th conference on Winter Simulation (2005): 69–82; Li An, “Modeling 
Human Decisions in Coupled Human and Natural Systems: Review of Agent-Based Models,” Ecological 
Modelling 229 (2012): 25–36. 
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use of local, state, and federal policy documents that have identified various SOP models 
employed in the management of emergency events. 
2. Research Methodology 
This thesis embraces a policy analysis research design to examine the efficacy of 
crisis response SOPs in complex scenarios. First, the thesis clarifies the principal 
components of a crisis, explaining how the prediction-dependent SOP functions within a 
complex operational setting. The thesis then explores the characteristic unpredictability 
of complex environments and its cause. The work also considers the origins of the SOP in 
the complicated operational setting and its relative evolution within the modern, complex 
operational setting. The thesis further explains the opposing characteristics of these two 
operational domains by contrasting the linear and predictable relationships of agents in 
the complicated realm against the nonlinear—and therefore unpredictable—relationships 
of agents in the complex realm. 
The thesis examines the modern, complex crisis environment by conducting case 
studies of three significant complex crises: the September 11 terror attacks, Hurricane 
Katrina, and the Fukushima-Dai’ichi nuclear meltdown. These rely on empirical accounts 
and peer-reviewed analysis to study the interactions of crisis responders within the 
complex crisis environment. Analysis of the case studies identified successful and 
unsuccessful response practices within these complex disasters. Specifically, the analysis 
connected the responders’ relative success or failure in mitigating complex emergency 
scenarios with their ability to manage unpredictable events. 
After comprehensively exploring and analyzing the weaknesses of the existing 
SOP model, the work recommends a method to resolve these complexity-driven 
limitations. The thesis contends that integrating adaptability into the SOP model will 
make SOP-driven crisis response more relevant and effective in the complex 
environment. After discussing the potential value of the adaptive design proposals, the 
thesis presents potential methods to implement these recommendations within the HSE 
crisis response arena. Subsequent to the discussion of the adaptive design proposals, this 
work discusses the value of multi-agent system (MAS) computer simulations as decision 
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support tools. The thesis then presents an actual MAS experiment designed and executed 
to evaluate the potential impact of an adaptive SOP in a complex crisis environment.  
3. Output 
If crisis professionals depend on predictive SOP guidance, modern emergency 
response is weakened by the unpredictability of complex events. To counter this 
vulnerability, policy makers should consider modifying the traditional SOP-driven 
approach to emergency management by promoting adaptability as a countermeasure to 
complexity. The intended output of this thesis is the proposal of executable solutions to 
remedy the identified flaws in today’s emergency response paradigm. This work should 
convince HSE policy makers of the need to address complexity in emergency 
management and provide a practical means to achieve that goal.  
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The following chapters explore the notional challenges of prediction-dependent 
SOPs applied to unpredictable, complex disasters. Chapter II examines the origins of the 
SOP and the nature of complexity theory. Chapter III explores case studies of modern 
crises to evaluate the effectiveness of emergency response SOPs in action—assessing 
what worked and what did not. Chapter IV proposes two methods to integrate 
adaptability into the “traditional” SOP model. These adaptive SOP modifications are 
based on the principal conclusion that unpredictable crisis environments demand an 
adaptable approach to emergency response. Finally, Chapter V presents the results of a 
computer simulation that illustrates the hypothetical improvements crisis responders 
could achieve by implementing the adaptive SOP proposals. 
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II. THE DISASTER DILEMMA: COMPLEXITY VERSUS 
PREDICTION 
A. THE ERA OF COMPLEXITY 
Toward the end of the twentieth century, connectivity in the human environment 
increased substantially through improvements in telecommunications, Web-based 
information sharing, and electronic connections between business and government 
infrastructures. As Mary Uhl-Bien et al. state, “21st century organizations are facing a 
complex competitive landscape driven largely by globalization and the technological 
revolution.”25 Prior to these advancements, organizational relationships had more linear 
connections, limiting the influence that human and non-human elements within a system 
could exert on each other. While a significant number of factors influenced a complicated 
working environment, their linear relationships often yielded an orderly, predictable 
outcome. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between a complicated and a complex system. 
The technological improvements of the twenty-first century have introduced a new era of 
global networks, interdependent infrastructures, and high-velocity communication, 
which, in turn, has increased the incidence of complexity in the environment.  
                                                 
25 Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory,” 299. 
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Figure 1.  Complicated System versus Complex System26 
Connectivity in a complex environment allows a multitude of elements within a 
common system to influence each other, producing scenarios and outcomes that defy 
long-term prediction. As Bruce MacLennan states, “Complex systems manifest emergent 
properties, which cannot be explained in terms of simple, linear interactions among the 
system’s components.”27 These emergent events and outcomes are the by-products of 
nonlinear reactions to other agents within the system. Sociologists David Snowden and 
Mary Boone further clarify the significant influence of elements interacting within a 
complex system: “The interactions are nonlinear, and minor changes can produce 
                                                 
26 Adapted from Stanley McChrystal et al., “Let General Stanley McChrystal Explain Why 
Adaptability Trumps Hierarchy,” FastCompany, May 12, 2015, 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3045477/work-smart/goodbye-org-chart. 
27 Bruce MacLennan, “Evolutionary Psychology, Complex Systems, and Social Theory,” Soundings 
90, no. 3/4 (2007): 172. 
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disproportionately major consequences.”28 The principles of complexity apply to the 
modern crisis environment as well. As General Stanley McChrystal et al. describe, “New 
technologies have created an unprecedented proliferation of opportunities for small, 
historically disenfranchised actors. … Terrorists, insurgents, and cybercriminals have 
taken advantage of speed and interdependence to cause death and wreak havoc. But it all 
exhibits the unpredictability that is a hallmark of complexity.”29 McChrystal et al. claim 
that man-made disasters can exhibit the characteristics of a complex system; for instance, 
terrorist groups can coordinate or adjust attack strategies with a cellular telephone from 
anywhere on the planet. Likewise, the connectivity among civil infrastructure creates a 
complex system vulnerable to natural disasters. For example, storm-related damage to a 
local power grid can cause overload and failure in adjacent power grids, resulting in 
widespread blackouts and cascading infrastructure collapses in dependent civil services.  
1. The Cynefin Framework 
Today’s application of the standard operating procedure (SOP) depends on 
accurate predictions of the operating environment to recommend the ideal steps to 
accomplish mission goals. Therefore, an SOP works best in an ordered setting where the 
various elements at work have simple, linear influence on each other. This state of order 
produces a stable environment in which policy makers can effectively project the 
operational scenario. Picture the analogy of a toy car on an assembly line: each phase of 
the production process adds a new piece to the product without any outside influences. 
Each stage is a preordained step in the SOP; one can easily predict the end result of a 
completed toy because there are few factors influencing the process. Snowden and Boone 
developed a structure to depict the relationship of influences on elements within a system, 
the Cynefin Framework (see Figure 2).30 
                                                 
28 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review 85, no. 11 (2007): 71. 
29 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 61–62. 
30 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework,” 68–77. 
 14 
 
Figure 2.  Cynefin Framework31 
The first two domains of the Cynefin Framework are simple and complicated, 
both of which describe ordered environments where relationships between system 
elements are observable and outcomes are predictable. The simple context is alternatively 
described as “obvious” because the relationship between factors is evident, as in the toy 
car example. The complicated domain has more factors at work within a common system, 
but the interaction of these factors is also linear and the outcome remains predictable, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The inherent predictability of these domains creates the optimal 
environment for an SOP.  
The complex domain is an interconnected, fast-paced environment. Characteristics 
of complexity exist in the twenty-first century global business arena, in unconventional 
military engagements, and in the emergency response field. While complex environments 
are far less predictable than complicated environments, decision makers are able to 
identify consistent patterns in the complex domain through trial and error, enabling them 
to make effective choices in the field. The fourth domain in the framework is chaotic, 
                                                 
31 Source: Ibid. 
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representing an environment of patternless “turbulence” that Snowden and Boone 
compare to the immediate aftermath of the September 11 plane impacts.32 In this unstable 
setting, decision makers are unable to pre-plan their tactics; they can only react to 
elements within the scenario in an attempt to “transform the situation from chaos to 
complexity, where the identification of emerging patterns can both help prevent future 
crises and discern new opportunities.”33 The fifth and final domain in the Cynefin 
Framework is disorder, a predicament that confounds decision makers with an 
unmanageable environment. Disorder defies any effort to identify patterns or 
characteristics that might be consistent with the other four domains.  
2. Complex Adaptive Systems 
As Snowden and Boone state, minor influences in a complex environment can 
significantly impact the stability of the entire system.34 This is particularly relevant 
during crisis responses as the interaction of various elements can quickly force the actual 
event to evolve away from the predicted or anticipated outcome, which reduces the 
effectiveness of SOP guidance. In a changing crisis environment, emergency responders 
are more likely to achieve successful results by assuming a flexible approach. 
Modern sociologists are developing a discipline that studies complexity, its 
application to human systems, and the role of adaptability in successfully operating 
within a complex environment.35 This analytical field is called complex adaptive systems 
(CAS), and it has significant implications for the future of emergency planning and 
disaster response. CAS research applied to emergency management pursues a number of 
diverse paths, from self-organizing emergency response among the private sector 
(emergent groups) to intelligent technology that interprets crisis events and recommends 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 74. 
34 Ibid., 68–77. 
35 Glenda Eoyang, “Complex Adaptive Systems CAS,” presented at The Kellogg Foundation, May 
2004, http://www.bobwilliams.co.nz/Systems_Resources_files/CASmaterial.pdf. 
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mitigation responses (Interactive, Intelligent, Spatial Information Systems).36 There are 
many different aspects of CAS research, but they universally promote adaptability and 
diminish reliance on inflexible principles such as those that make up the SOP model. 
Bolton and Stolcis also argue for the application of adaptability in disaster response 
“when a crisis is imminent or occurring and individual agents … need the freedom and 
flexibility to depart from traditional hierarchical management practices, take risks, and 
draw upon their imaginations.”37 As demonstrated by experienced crisis professionals 
choosing to diverge from an SOP, CAS research also supports the argument that complex 
crises demand adaptable, innovative responses.  
B. THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 
The formal use of SOPs appears to have first developed in nineteenth century 
Germany as a military strategy championed by German Field Marshall Helmuth Karl 
Bernhard Graf von Moltke.38 Von Moltke’s theory of auftragstaktik translates as 
“mission strategy,” and was a process by which military leaders developed mission goals 
into specific tasks based around a particular event.39 This concept revolutionized the 
military approach to command and control by allowing commanders to write a set of 
orders that encompassed the overall mission while tailoring specific instructions for 
subordinates to execute in the field. Arguably, modern U.S. military strategy derives from 
von Moltke’s auftragstaktik principles.  
The use of SOPs has remained a principal management tool for more than 150 
years because it offers significant benefits as a guide for personnel expected to operate in 
the field without supervision. Today’s government agencies and private companies 
generally characterize an SOP as an official document that predicts the operating 
environment and provides a checklist of recommended actions that conform to agency 
                                                 
36 Kendra and Wachtendorf, “Creativity in Emergency Response”; Comfort et al., “Complex Systems 
in Crisis,” 144–158. 
37 Michael J. Bolton and Gregory B. Stolcis, “Overcoming Failure of Imagination in Crisis 
Management: The Complex Adaptive System,” The Innovation Journal 13, no. 3 (2008): 10. 
38 “The Value of Standard Operating Procedures,” Mosaic, October 22, 2012, 
http://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/WhitePapers/WP1086_Standard_Operating_Procedures.pdf. 
39 Gunther, “Auftragstaktik.” 
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policy. The Environmental Protection Agency defines the purpose of an SOP as a 
document that “minimizes variation and promotes quality through consistent 
implementation of a process or procedure within the organization. … Ultimately, the 
benefits of a valid SOP are reduced work effort, along with improved comparability, 
credibility, and legal defensibility.”40 The SOP model seeks consistency in executing 
mission goals by promoting rote behavior. 
1. The Clockwork SOP 
While the employment of SOPs originated in a military environment, they also 
exist in the business realm to accomplish the same basic goals: consistent quality, labor 
efficiency, and a safe work setting. Frederick Winslow Taylor, the “father of scientific 
management,” contributed to industrial efficiency in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.41 As a business consultant, he stressed that economy of motion was 
the key to efficient production. The SOPs he designed for industrial production increased 
output tremendously. He accomplished these improvements not through better 
technology but by standardizing an employee’s optimal efficiency of motion. Taylor 
implemented changes to the industrial assembly line to perfect rote performance and 
eliminate individualized production methods based on experience or creativity. Taylor 
demanded that every worker complete each task within a certain amount of time and 
follow specific instructions: “Set tire on machine ready to turn. … Rough face front edge. 
… Finish face front edge. … Rough bore front. … Finish bore front.”42 Within the linear 
environment of a factory production floor—the simple domain in Snowden’s Cynefin 
Framework—Taylor’s optimization SOPs drastically improved production results.43 His 
methods also significantly reduced costs and manpower requirements. Taylor proved that 
in the ordered environment, a meticulous SOP provided effective guidance, because there 
was no need for individuality or creativity among his laborers.  
                                                 
40 Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance for Preparing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
(EPA 600/B-07-001) (Washington, DC: Office of Environmental Information, 2007), 1–2, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/g6-final.pdf. 
41 Mary Ellen Papesh, “Frederick Winslow Taylor,” (Class paper, St. Francis University, 2000). 
42 Kanigel, “Taylor‐made,” 19. 
43 Ibid. 
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2. The Complex Business SOP 
Modern companies can take advantage of dynamic business opportunities created 
by the complex domain’s interconnectivity and globalization. Economists Manuj and 
Mentzer explain, “Due to demanding customers and competitive pressures, businesses 
today are restructuring themselves to operate on a global basis to take advantage of the 
international product, factor, and capital markets.”44 However, the consequence for 
competing in an unpredictable environment is exposure to fluctuations among diverse, 
nonlinear business relationships. Consider the hypothetical example of a small 
technology company based in Roanoke, Virginia. Despite its remote location, this 
business can take advantage of today’s complex market to obtain electronic components 
from India, production software and technical support from Germany, and financing from 
Switzerland. While these choices may provide the company with superior options in cost 
and production efficiency, the company is vulnerable to problems that impact its 
suppliers around the world. Therefore, the business should devise an SOP that respects 
the hyper-connected nature of complexity and accommodates the impact of unexpected 
influences on its business operation. The following example from the computer software 
industry illustrates the complex business SOP.  
The computer industry’s installation process for software updates is a complex 
business SOP. The software manager’s goal is to produce optimal product quality 
delivered in an effective manner. The interdependence and connectivity between lines of 
programming code in a computer application exhibits characteristics of complexity. Lines 
of programming code interact with each other in a nonlinear fashion to produce the 
intended service of the software program. Christopher Myers describes computer code as 
a complex system: “Software is built up out of many interacting units and subsystems at 
many levels of granularity … and the interactions and collaborations of those pieces can 
be used to define … a system.”45 The hyper-connectivity within software operating 
                                                 
44 Manuj and Mentzer, “Global Supply Chain Risk Management,” 133. 
45 Christopher R. Myers, “Software Systems as Complex Networks: Structure, Function, and 
Evolvability of Software Collaboration Graphs,” Physical Review E 68, no. 4 (2003): 046116-1, doi: 
10.1103/PhysRevE.68.046116. 
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systems allows for unpredictable outcomes as small errors can lead to cascading 
problems and even system collapse.  
To accommodate elements of complexity in the software environment, 
implementation SOPs require test modes as the first step in mitigating prediction-defiant 
system issues. For instance, the Publications Office of the European Union (POEU) 
regulates the implementation of new computer code: “No software installation in the 
production environment will be allowed without prior validation in the test 
environment.”46 This SOP promotes the trial-and-error process used to identify 
successful operating methods in the complex domain, as described in the previous 
section’s discussion of the Cynefin Framework. To manage concerns over process errors, 
the POEU’s installation SOP requires procedures that “check the correct 
installation/working of the application.”47 The principal objective in the modern business 
SOP is to organize a consistent procedure that emphasizes awareness of the hyper-
connectivity within the complex system and continually reevaluates the operating 
environment for unexpected influences. 
3. The Modern Crisis SOP 
Law enforcement, as a part of the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE), seeks a 
similar consistency in the “product” of its assigned duties. Procedures that define 
emergency response to a crisis vary widely among agencies; some provide specific 
checklist instructions to guide field officers and others provide loose frameworks. As 
shown in Figure 3, the Chicago Police Department’s Active Shooter Incident Plan 
exemplifies a highly specific crisis SOP for police officers.  
 
                                                 
46 Publications Office of the European Union, Technical Environment and SOPs, 17. 
47 Ibid., 21. 
 20 
 
Figure 3.  Excerpt from Chicago Police Department’s 
Active Shooter Incident Plan48 
Unlike the complex business SOP example, the police procedures do not 
recognize or allow for complexity in the scenario. Instead, this example assumes that 
active shooters behave in predictable ways that correspond with the anticipated event. 
Generally speaking, because human behavior is influenced in many ways—by emotions, 
environment, or morality—it may demonstrate the complex system’s characteristic 
unpredictability. Therefore, crisis professionals should expect human beings to take 
unanticipated actions—nonlinear behavior that severely limits the effectiveness of a 
prediction-dependent SOP.  
The police SOP example lists the recommended steps to achieve a specific 
mission objective; the overarching goal is to make contact with the active shooter to 
prevent further injuries. This procedure imparts effective guidance if the operational 
setting remains consistent with the prediction, but what happens if the scenario exhibits 
                                                 




the unpredictability of the complex domain? The active shooter could have unanticipated 
accomplices or explosive devices set in the building. What if the active shooter is acting 
under the influence of a psychoactive drug that induces non-rational, erratic behavior? 
The police protocols recommend that officers initially evaluate the environment before 
acting, which implies a degree of flexibility. However, the SOP does not recommend that 
officers continue to re-assess the situation for unanticipated changes that may require 
them to adapt their tactics. Therefore, as opposed to the computer software example, the 
police crisis SOP does not account for the impact of complexity on the emergency 
setting.  
C. A FAILURE TO EVOLVE? 
Business SOPs have evolved since the simple, linear domain of Taylor’s 
production floor to accommodate the complexity of the modern business arena. 
Conversely, SOPs for the crisis professional have not evolved to account for complexity 
in emergency scenarios. This discrepancy is not necessarily a failure to evolve as much as 
a failure to adapt. It may be the crisis professional’s reliance on accumulated work 
experience that has diminished the guiding role SOPs play in emergency response. One 
could argue that because crisis professionals rely substantially on their work experience, 
SOPs do not need to address the unpredictability of a complex environment. In his book 
Thinking, Fast and Slow, psychologist Daniel Kahneman, quoting Herbert Simon, agrees 
that experience informs decision making in a crisis environment:  
“The situation has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to 
information stored in memory, and the information provides the answer. 
Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition.” This strong 
statement reduces the apparent magic of intuition to the everyday 
experience of memory. We marvel at the story of the firefighter who has a 
sudden urge to escape a burning house just before it collapses, because the 
firefighter knows the danger intuitively, “without knowing how he 
knows.”49 
The aggregate of the firefighter’s everyday crisis experiences refines his decision-making 
acumen to an instinctive level. It is this reflexive response that enables some crisis 
                                                 
49 Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 236–237. 
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professionals to react swiftly and effectively to an unanticipated development, despite the 
SOP providing no relevant guidance. Kahneman also identifies the downside of intuitive 
decision making when instinctual choices are not informed by relevant experience. He 
uses the example of a stockbroker’s decision to buy shares in an automotive manufacturer 
because his “gut feeling” suggests the company makes a good car.50 As the broker’s 
opinion of the car does not rely on actual automotive experience or reliable insight into 
the company, his decision to invest is poorly informed by this gut feeling and may lead to 
an unfavorable outcome.  
Similar to Kahneman’s uninformed stockbroker example, not every crisis 
professional within the HSE has enough relevant experience to intuitively manage an 
unpredictable emergency. A rookie police officer is just as likely to face a complex 
emergency as an experienced veteran. Further, not all experienced crisis professionals 
react optimally in a high-stress setting. For example, Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) officials applied an irrelevant hijacking SOP to the September 11 attacks—even 
though the event diverged rapidly from the anticipated emergency. As Hales and 
Pronovost claim, “Human error is inevitable—particularly under stressful conditions. It 
has been demonstrated that levels of cognitive function are compromised as stress and 
fatigue level increase, as is often the norm in certain complex, high-intensity fields of 
work.”51 Hales and Pronovost go on to say that as judgment and proficiency diminish in 
the high-stress setting, operators resort to checklists and other cognitive aids in an effort 
to maintain efficiency.52 Clinging to an ineffective SOP in a complex crisis can yield 
tragic consequences such as the failure to realize the threat on September 11 was a terror 
attack, not a conventional hijacking event.  
From an organizational theory perspective, Karl E. Weick et al. make a related 
argument for abandoning hierarchical routines when an operator detects procedural errors 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Brigette M. Hales and Peter J. Pronovost, “The Checklist—A Tool for Error Management and 




in complex environments.53 When the SOP provides ineffectual guidance, the emergency 
intensifies. If the crisis professional does not have relevant work experience to draw 
upon, he may become too focused on the “cheat sheet” to recognize the evolving crisis 
scenario. Because the crisis SOP does not stress the impact of complexity on the 
environment, as demonstrated by the police SOP example, it offers limited value as a 
guiding paradigm in a complex emergency. 
Benefits of the SOP in Modern Crises: Despite its diminished applicability in a 
complex environment, the SOP remains a relevant tool in the emergency response field 
because not every aspect of a crisis is complex. Crisis professionals must also manage 
events that demonstrate the characteristics of the simple or complicated Cynefin domains 
for which SOP guidance still applies. Additionally, the predictive aspect of the SOP 
model provides policy makers and emergency planners a “shopping list” for various types 
of crises. For example, the types of resources and personnel needed to mitigate a terror 
attack compared to a hurricane vary widely. Organizational theorists Kendra and 
Wachtendorf describe the value of SOPs as a planning tool that promotes adaptability: 
“Prior preparedness increases the ability to improvise. … This planning forms the basis 
for decision making in emergency environments, and informs decisions by anticipating 
possible challenges or pitfalls that could come as a consequence of improvised 
activities.”54 Organizations within the HSE should not abandon SOPs as a tool in crisis 
management as they still provide relevant guidance in certain aspects of emergency 
planning and response. The next chapter examines disaster dilemmas in action by 
analyzing case studies of three modern, complex crises: the September 11 terror attacks, 
Hurricane Katrina, and the Fukushima-Dai’ichi nuclear event. 
                                                 
53 Karl E. Weick, Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, and David Obstfeld, “Organizing for High Reliability: 
Processes of Collective Mindfulness,” Crisis Management 3 (2008): 81–123. 
54 Kendra and Wachtendorf, “Creativity in Emergency Response,” 127. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
Modern crises often demonstrate the prediction-defiant characteristics of 
complexity. In a complex emergency, the standard operating procedure (SOP) contributes 
limited value because the actual event deviates from the expectation, which significantly 
reduces the relevance and effectiveness of the recommended actions. Each of the 
following disasters represents a crisis environment that exhibited characteristics of 
complexity. As such, these case studies afford the opportunity to assess SOP-driven 
responses in action and compare them to alternative response efforts, particularly those 
with an adaptive response approach. The following analysis demonstrates that SOP-
driven responses were often ineffective in dealing with a complex event, but adaptive 
countermeasures frequently achieved success despite the less predictable crisis setting. 
A. SEPTEMBER 11 TERROR ATTACKS 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 al Qaeda operatives boarded four 
commercial aircraft and seized control of the cockpits shortly after takeoff. After gaining 
control of the planes, the hijackers intentionally crashed them into the twin towers of the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The operatives appear to have crashed the fourth 
plane in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, when it became evident the passengers 
might regain control of the aircraft. The coordinated terror attack of September 11 was 
one of the most significant crises in U.S. history in terms of lives lost, economic impact, 
and damage to the nation’s sense of security. Officials estimate that 2,977 people died at 
the three crash sites, and the total cost in reconstruction and related economic losses 
exceeded $191 billion.55 This case study demonstrates that SOP-driven emergency 
planning and responses were frequently ineffective, but adaptive countermeasures 
employed by crisis professionals and emergent ad hoc groups often succeeded in the 
unpredictable crisis setting. 
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On the morning of September 11, the initial identification and management of the 
crisis fell on the shoulders of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). From the initial detection of a 
problem with American Airlines Flight 11, the 9/11 Commission states that crisis 
professionals were inhibited by their adherence to SOPs: 
The protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a 
hijacking presumed that the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable 
and would not attempt to disappear; there would be time to address the 
problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; 
and the hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a 
suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.56 
FAA officers applied the agency hijacking SOP to the unfolding crisis even after the 
hijackers’ behavior deviated from expected behavior. The responding FAA officers 
adhered to the hijacking protocol by attempting communication with the pilots and 
coordinating support from NORAD. However, these efforts were ineffective as the actual 
crisis was a terror attack, not a hijacking. Therefore, the FAA’s attempt to respond to the 
wrong type of crisis wasted time that could have been spent assessing the true nature of 
the event. This behavior is consistent with Parker and Stern’s belief that SOPs can 
become an exploitable liability during a complex crisis.57 The unanticipated and even 
patternless nature of the terrorists’ behavior—consistent with the Cynefin Framework’s 
complex domain—rendered the SOP-recommended actions irrelevant. 
Incorrect assumptions about the operating environment also hindered NORAD’s 
emergency planning and response. The agency believed the “dominant threat to be from 
cruise missiles” and depended on scenarios and related SOPs that assumed a hijacked 
plane would only originate from outside the United States.58 Similarly, the flight 
attendants followed company SOPs that required them to cooperate with the hijackers, 
anticipating a negotiated solution through law enforcement intervention.59 Essentially, 
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FAA officials, NORAD officers, and airline crews followed ineffective crisis SOPs; the 
adherence to those inappropriate procedures prevented timely countermeasures. 
What could these agencies have done differently? If the FAA recognized that the 
crisis had diverged from the predicted hijacking scenario, the agency could have departed 
from standard procedures earlier. FAA officials could have pushed for a faster, more 
significant response from NORAD, hypothetically giving the responding military pilots a 
chance to intercept the airliners. National Operations Manager Ben Sliney eventually 
departed from agency SOPs when he grounded all commercial flights across the United 
States.60 However, the agency implemented this decision approximately one hour after 
the first plane struck the World Trade Center—too late to save the other planes from 
capture. While the FAA’s determination to ground all commercial flights demonstrates an 
element of adaptability, it also illustrates how the unforgiving pace of modern disasters 
can render innovative decisions ineffective when delayed by adherence to non-adaptive 
or inappropriate SOPs. 
Adaptability in the September 11 Crisis Response: While SOP-driven 
preparations and actions often hindered crisis response efforts, many emergency 
responders were able to navigate the complex and chaotic domains by taking a flexible or 
adaptive approach. Kendra and Wachtendorf analyzed the September 11 attacks and drew 
a similar conclusion: “Creativity is such a significant feature of response to an extreme 
event that planning and training should move explicitly toward enhancing creativity and 
the resultant improvisation at all levels of responding organizations.”61 The FAA 
obtained minor success by departing from SOP guidance to communicate directly with 
NORAD. As the 9/11 Commission reported, “Lower-level officials improvised—for 
example, the FAA’s Boston Center bypassed the chain of command and directly 
contacted NEADS [the Northeast Air Defense Sector of NORAD] after the first 
hijacking.”62 The way the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) evacuated the water surrounding 
lower Manhattan was an even stronger example of adaptive disaster mitigation. USCG 
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officers and inspectors successfully enlisted the aid of private and commercial watercraft 
to transport more than 500,000 citizens from the disaster area. USCG officers relied on 
their experience to recognize that certain regulations must be “adjusted with respect to 
ambient conditions and authority devolved to personnel closer to the scene for greater 
flexibility.”63 The success of these efforts did not derive from adherence to agency SOP; 
rather, it was the recognition that standard methods must yield to adaptive actions to 
solve an unanticipated problem. 
While the New York Fire Department and other crisis professionals worked in 
and around the World Trade Center disaster site, emergent groups of private citizens self-
organized to provide ad hoc safety, health, and security needs in the surrounding area. 
These semi-autonomous groups developed a loose connection with New York City’s 
Emergency Operations Center but rendered assistance in a decentralized fashion as they 
identified various needs in the crisis environment. As Tierney states, “Individuals and 
groups continued to show an amazing amount of ingenuity in circumventing and 
subverting procedures in order to provide goods and services they believed were 
needed.”64 These emergent groups were uniquely suited to operate in the complex crisis 
environment on September 11 as the needs of the moment inspired improvisational 
solutions in the absence of SOP guidance.  
The most poignant example of successful, adaptive behavior was the self-
organized response from the passengers aboard United Airlines Flight 93. Armed with 
the knowledge that terrorists had hijacked three earlier flights and flown them into U.S. 
landmarks, strangers banded together to prevent the al Qaeda operatives from achieving 
their goal.65 This emergent group saved an untold number of lives by prohibiting the 
flight from reaching its target destination. Despite the chaotic setting in the captured 
airliner, a group of civilians devised an effective solution to mitigate the evolving crisis, 
sacrificing themselves in the process. These examples demonstrate how an adaptive 
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approach to crisis response, either in the absence or defiance of an SOP, can succeed in 
the complex or chaotic environment of a modern crisis. 
The SOPs on which various crisis planning and response entities relied during the 
September 11 events were ineffectual because they applied prediction-dependent 
guidance in complex or chaotic environments. By the time officials realized that the 
nature of the threat had significantly deviated from the initial assessment, it was too late 
to effectively mitigate the crisis. The day’s operational successes consistently 
demonstrated examples of adaptive decision making. Kendra and Wachtendorf clarify 
this point: “While advance planning and preparedness serve as the backbone of disaster 
response efforts, creativity enhances the ability to adapt to the demands imposed upon 
individuals and organizations during crises.”66 Whether it was the USCG’s departure 
from SOPs or an emergent group’s operation in the absence of a standardized process, 
innovative decision making is clearly a characteristic that organizations must foster 
within their emergency responses. Likewise, the SOP is of limited value in the response 
to a complex crisis because it lacks the flexibility to adapt to unanticipated and emergent 
behavior. 
B. HURRICANE KATRINA 
On August 29, 2005, at approximately 6:00 a.m., category-three Hurricane 
Katrina struck the New Orleans metropolitan area. By the second day of the Katrina 
event, the levee system had partially collapsed, flooding 80 percent of New Orleans.67 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) describes Hurricane Katrina as 
the most catastrophic natural disaster in U.S. history; the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration estimates that 1,833 people died, and the total damage was 
approximately $108 billion as a result of the storm.68 While the storm impacted 17 U.S. 
states to varying degrees, the vast majority of the deaths and property damage took place 
in Louisiana; this case study focuses on the preparation and crisis response in New 
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Orleans. Analysis of the Katrina event further validates the argument that the application 
of SOPs is of limited value in mitigating a complex or chaotic crisis, yet adaptable 
responses often succeed. 
The U.S. government was not surprised by the Hurricane Katrina disaster; 
officials had been expecting a hurricane crisis in the Gulf region for several years. In 
2001, FEMA asserted that a major hurricane disaster in New Orleans was one of the three 
most likely natural crises facing the United States in the coming 30 years.69 The actual 
arrival of the storm did not catch the government unprepared either; FEMA had staged 
resources just outside the impact zone and was at least nominally ready to respond. The 
initial stages of the emergency response were reasonably successful: more than 80 
percent of New Orleanians were evacuated before the storm made landfall.70 The 
successful relocation of area residents was an improvement over the New Orleans 
performance in 2004, during the less successful evacuations for Hurricane Ivan and a 
FEMA hurricane training scenario (“Hurricane Pam”) that took place the same year.71 
President George W. Bush declared a state of emergency for Louisiana two days before 
Katrina made landfall, initiating the process of federal emergency assistance. In 
summary, the local, state, and federal government had followed SOPs and appeared to be 
ready for the arrival of Hurricane Katrina. However, the reality of the Katrina event was 
very different from the anticipated crisis, and the SOP-driven preparations proved 
insufficient. 
What transformed the Hurricane Katrina event from a well-managed disaster 
response into one of the most substantial government failures in recent history? Simply 
stated, when Katrina struck New Orleans, a series of unanticipated problems occurred, 
demonstrating the prediction-defiant setting inherent in the complex and chaotic Cynefin 
domains. The New Orleanian crisis SOPs could not manage the unexpected deviation of 
the storm threat, so when the 10 to 28-foot storm surge destroyed a significant portion of 
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the protective levees, emergency planners were unprepared for the sudden escalation of 
the crisis. Charles F. Parker et al. agree that SOPs developed to manage specific crises—
in this case, the arrival of a category-three hurricane—were “completely inappropriate” 
and not “suitably imaginative” to manage the complex disaster brought about by the 
collapse of the levees.72 The U.S. House of Representatives’ analysis levied significant 
blame against the failure to send federal disaster responders and supplies in a timely 
fashion.73 The process of mobilizing the emergency response was one of the first SOPs to 
fail the victims of the Katrina crisis. The standard procedure for deploying federal relief 
required a multi-layered bureaucratic interplay that could not start until the Louisiana 
government made a formal request for assistance. After receiving the formal request, the 
relief application had to pass through several levels of governmental approval before 
finally yielding the presidential declaration of a major disaster. President Bush declared a 
major disaster for Louisiana at 1:45 p.m. on August 29, the day Katrina made landfall and 
approximately five hours after the levees began to collapse. Unlike the earlier declaration 
of a state of emergency, this second presidential declaration fully mobilized federal 
emergency relief, but the heaviest damage had already taken place without federal relief 
in position to render immediate assistance.74 The crisis had moved from the marginally 
predictable, complex environment in the Cynefin Framework to the unpredictable chaotic 
domain. As in the September 11 case study, the complex and chaotic characteristics of 
the Katrina crisis rendered the prediction-dependent SOPs of limited value as crisis 
response tools. 
The SOPs that FEMA employed in managing the crisis response during the 
Katrina event were often ill-suited to the urgency of the situation. Sobel and Leeson 
claim that despite significant improvements to FEMA’s methods and capabilities, the 
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decentralized disaster response to the attack on the World Trade Center towers was more 
effective than the centralized, FEMA-driven emergency response to Hurricane Katrina.75 
In one instance, several hundred firefighters volunteered to assist FEMA with disaster 
relief. However, FEMA’s SOPs required them to attend several days of pre-deployment 
training on topics ranging from sexual harassment to the history of FEMA before 
deploying to the disaster zone. When FEMA eventually sent these experienced crisis 
professionals, FEMA officials tasked them with distributing informational fliers to local 
residents.76 Sheriff Dennis Randle of Carroll County, Indiana, also intended to send 
resources and manpower to assist in the Katrina relief efforts. However, when the sheriff 
attempted to follow SOPs, he was so inundated with paperwork to obtain FEMA approval 
that he abandoned the attempt; his supplies and manpower never reached New Orleans.77 
Emergency planning in New Orleans centered on SOPs that anticipated the arrival of a 
category-three hurricane but an intact levee system. In response to the actual event, 
FEMA applied inappropriate protocols for the deployment of resources into a crisis zone 
flooded by collapsed levees. The agency’s SOPs were too inflexible to provide useful 
assistance for preparing or responding when the Katrina event demonstrated the 
characteristic unpredictability of a complex system. 
Adaptability in the Hurricane Katrina Crisis Response: As in the September 
11 disaster response, responders achieved significant successes when they took action 
without SOP guidance or even contrary to their agency’s SOPs. As a counterpoint to the 
example of Sheriff Randle’s attempts to deploy emergency assistance, Sheriff Warren 
Evans of Wayne County, Michigan, ignored the SOP requiring FEMA approval and 
successfully arrived in New Orleans with nine trucks of supplies and 33 deputy 
sheriffs.78 Likewise, the self-styled “Cajun Navy,” comprising hundreds of privately-
owned boats, did not seek FEMA permission to provide assistance and managed to rescue 
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approximately 4,000 survivors in the New Orleans area. The owners of the Acadian 
Ambulance Service employed their ambulances and helicopters to evacuate more than 
7,000 survivors.79 Dr. Gregory Henderson also acted without government permission to 
enlist the assistance of several New Orleans police officers to raid abandoned pharmacies 
for medication and supplies, with which he furnished ad hoc medical assistance in 
downtown New Orleans.80 Like the self-organizing groups that successfully provided 
assistance in and around the World Trade Center, the people of New Orleans benefited 
from the self-organizing, emergent crisis response of private citizens. 
Both the USCG and a Vancouver search-and-rescue team began helicopter rescue 
operations before receiving approval from FEMA to render assistance. USCG efforts 
were so effective during the crisis event that the Bush administration placed USCG Vice 
Admiral Thad Allen in charge of the entire Hurricane Katrina relief effort after asking 
FEMA Director Michael Brown to step down.81 The USCG’s motto is Semper Paratus, 
“Always Ready,” and its organizational response to both the September 11 and Katrina 
mega-crises reflect a posture of flexibility in the face of the unexpected. 
Analysts Charles F. Parker et al. acknowledge that Katrina was an extraordinary 
crisis, but the ineffective disaster response was a normal and, therefore, repeatable failure 
of the nation’s capacity to respond to a complex disaster.82 The U.S. House of 
Representatives’ analysis arrived at a similar conclusion, that the major deficiency in the 
Hurricane Katrina response and possibly with the philosophy of U.S. emergency 
management in general was a “failure of agility. Response plans at all levels of 
government lacked flexibility and adaptability.”83 The inadequate response during the 
Katrina event was not a miscarriage of preparation but a failure of the procedural 
philosophy behind the emergency plan. The complex and chaotic aspects of Hurricane 
                                                 
79 Stephenson and Bonabeau, “Expecting the Unexpected,” 1–9. 
80 U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative. 
81 Sobel and Leeson, “Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina,” 55–73.  
82 Parker et al., “Preventable Catastrophe,” 206–220. 
83 U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, 1. 
 34 
Katrina further illuminate the contrasting value of ineffective SOPs against successful 
adaptive responses when managing the unexpected. 
C. TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE/TSUNAMI AND FUKUSHIMA-DAI’ICHI 
MELTDOWN 
On March 11, 2011, at 2:46 p.m. local time, the magnitude 9.0 Tohoku 
earthquake struck in the Pacific Ocean, approximately 45 miles east of Japan.84 Tohoku 
was one of the five strongest earthquakes in recorded history, generating tsunamis that 
began to hit the Japanese coast within 20 minutes.85 In addition to the significant damage 
to Japan’s coastal population, infrastructure, and assets, the earthquake and tsunami 
waves crippled the Fukushima-Dai’ichi nuclear power plant. Damage to the nuclear plant 
ultimately led to a Level 7 nuclear incident, the gravest category on the International 
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale.86 Officials estimate that the storm caused the 
deaths of 15,891 people, the majority of whom drowned in tsunami waves that reached 
heights of 128 feet, and approximately $300 billion in damages. The ruined nuclear 
power plant continues to leak irradiated water into the Pacific Ocean.87 The following 
analysis of the Tohoku event and consequent meltdown at the Fukushima-Dai’ichi 
nuclear facility further substantiates the arguments that SOPs are of limited value in 
mitigating a complex or chaotic emergency and that crisis responders must employ 
adaptable measures to succeed. 
The first tsunami wave struck the Japanese coastline just 20 minutes after the 
earthquake, and massive waves continued to crash along a 2,000-km stretch of Japan’s 
Pacific coast for several hours. Ultimately, the tsunami flooded a 400 km2 area and 
penetrated more than 5 km inland. The Japanese government had previously determined 
that a magnitude 7.4 earthquake was 99 percent likely to strike Japan and had taken 
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precautions specific to this prediction. To protect the Japanese coastline, the government 
had installed early warning systems, offshore and onshore tsunami barriers, and vertical 
evacuation structures. Additionally, the population engaged in periodic evacuation 
training exercises.88 Unfortunately, these countermeasures were simply insufficient to 
mitigate the full impact of a 9.0 earthquake and the resulting tsunami; the wave surge 
washed away barriers and destroyed evacuation structures. Research scientists Okada 
Norio et al. summarize the disaster: “The tsunami triggered by the earthquake critically 
overwhelmed the coping capacity of the stricken areas. Preparedness is based on 
expectation and prediction, which had not taken into account the extreme situation that 
actually unfolded.”89 The evolution of this crisis into a catastrophic threat defied the 
projections of Japan’s emergency planning and introduced significant elements of 
complexity into the disaster event. Japanese tsunami preparedness was driven by SOPs 
that predicted a smaller storm and did not encourage the flexibility required to adjust the 
crisis response when the actual event deviated from the projection. 
1. Fukushima-Dai’ichi Nuclear Incident 
Evolving from the Tohoku earthquake, a very different type of crisis took place at 
the Fukushima-Dai’ichi nuclear power plant owned and operated by Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO). When the Tohoku earthquake first struck, the TEPCO site 
operators oversaw the implementation of SOPs for the immediate emergency shutdown 
of the reactors. Fortunately, three of the six reactors at Fukushima-Dai’ichi were offline 
for maintenance.90 An emergency shutdown requires inserting control rods into the 
reactor core to halt fission, the principal energy-producing reaction that yields nuclear 
power.91 Reactors continue to produce enormous heat after a shutdown and require 
cooling pumps to constantly circulate water to keep the nuclear fuel from melting through 
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the containment structures.92 In the Fukushima prefecture, damage from the earthquake 
shut down the area’s electrical grid, disabling the primary power source for the plant. 
However, the nuclear facility’s emergency SOP had anticipated the possible loss of 
power, and backup generators immediately engaged to run the pumps circulating coolant 
water to the reactors.93 At this point, onsite emergency responders followed the plant’s 
crisis SOP and obtained successful mitigation results because the prediction was 
consistent with the actual event. 
However, within an hour of the earthquake, the first of two 40-foot tsunami waves 
surged over the Fukushima-Dai’ichi plant’s 30-foot sea wall, severely damaging the 
coolant circulation pumps and ruining the emergency generators powering them. Power 
for the entire plant switched over to backup batteries, which were inadequate and died 
within a few hours. TEPCO had a final backup power source built into its SOPs—power 
supply trucks outfitted with high-voltage dynamos. Unfortunately, by the time TEPCO 
decided to send the trucks from TEPCO headquarters 250 km from the Fukushima-
Dai’ichi facility, the roads were impassable from earthquake damage and evacuation 
traffic.94 When the backup batteries expired, the Fukushima-Dai’ichi plant experienced a 
site blackout, which is the nuclear power industry’s worst-case scenario because it 
threatens a complete nuclear meltdown.95 This event was so thoroughly unimaginable 
that the facility SOPs did not provide a process to mitigate it.96 Site operators found 
themselves in a situation well outside their relevant work experience, stripped of any 
useful technology, and clinging to an SOP that no longer imparted useful guidance. As 
one TEPCO employee described the event, “We had undergone extensive training but 
none of that was applicable. It was as if we had had our legs and arms cut off and were 
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just sitting there looking at the data that was available.”97 The unanticipated impact of the 
tsunami waves caused interdependent systems within the nuclear power plant to collapse 
in a cascading effect, one system failure leading to another and another. These 
unexpected influences on the system were consistent with the Cynefin Framework’s 
complex domain. As previously illustrated in the September 11 and Hurricane Katrina 
case studies, the evolution of a crisis into the complex domain is a circumstance in which 
SOPs can only provide limited assistance, as the actual event has deviated from the 
predicted emergency. 
To further confuse the situation, Japan’s Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law did not 
have a clear procedure to identify which government agency was responsible for making 
decisions in the nuclear crisis. The Japanese Prime Minister ordered the evacuation of the 
area surrounding Fukushima-Dai’ichi, issued a declaration of a nuclear emergency, and 
established a nuclear emergency response headquarters.98 However, it appears that the 
government left the majority of the actual crisis response to the TEPCO employees at the 
facility. Okada Norio et al. describe the situation: “Coordination between the government 
(emergency response headquarters), the Tokyo Electric Power Company, and the nuclear 
and industrial safety agency were not sufficiently organized. Information was not 
simultaneously shared right after the disaster, which delayed efficient decision 
making.”99 Communication among these agencies was disjointed, which produced 
ineffective recommendations for SOP-derived actions. By the evening of March 11, the 
cascading failures caused by the site blackout induced a meltdown in Reactor 1. 
Subsequent efforts to mitigate the disaster over the next several days failed to prevent 
partial meltdowns in Reactors 2 and 3 as well as gas explosions that devastated several of 
the containment buildings, leaking radioactive material into the atmosphere.100 The 
unanticipated site blackout, the nuclear meltdowns, and the complete lack of relevant 
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SOP guidance intensified the crisis, demonstrating characteristics consistent with the 
Cynefin Framework’s chaotic domain, a turbulent, patternless environment. 
2. Adaptability in the Fukushima-Dai’ichi Crisis Response 
When the TEPCO site operators faced a site blackout scenario and an increasingly 
inadequate SOP, they were forced to adapt to the crisis. Employees harvested batteries 
from cars in the plant’s parking lot, studied wiring diagrams, and were able to restore 
power to the main control room’s instrument panels. With this partial restoration of 
power, employees could assess the status of the reactors and make decisions informed by 
current information.101 On the second day of the event, the facility manager ignored an 
order from TEPCO headquarters to stop injecting seawater to cool Reactor 1 as saltwater 
is typically forbidden for use as a reactor coolant. Experts believe that the plant 
manager’s choice to go “off script,” defying both SOPs and offsite instructions, prevented 
a more significant nuclear meltdown.102 Plant personnel faced with ruined circulation 
pumps innovated a method to cool the overheating reactors by employing onsite fire 
engines to inject water directly into the cooling system.103 Finally, when urgent efforts to 
cool the superheated reactors with water yielded an enormous build-up of steam, 
hydrogen, and other gases, site operators applied an air compressor to blast open a locked 
valve to release the pressure.104 While the facility suffered irreparable damage, the 
employees’ innovative efforts limited the impact of the nuclear incident. Their 
demonstrated adaptability yielded successful, if limited, crisis mitigation despite the 
complex and chaotic aspects of the disaster event. 
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D. CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
Emergency SOPs provided ineffective and often inadequate guidance to prepare 
for the complex crises of the September 11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and the 
Fukushima-Dai’ichi nuclear event. When the actual disasters deviated from the predicted 
events, emergency responders found themselves adhering to irrelevant procedures. The 
examination of successful governmental responses during these mega-crises identifies 
conscious decisions to depart from SOPs and embrace innovative solutions. In the 
instances of self-organized, emergent crisis responses from private industry and citizens, 
the absence of prescribed actions yielded adaptable behavior tailored to the needs of the 
specific emergency. 
The case studies demonstrated that SOPs fail to provide useful guidance for 
complex disasters because they lack the adaptability needed to manage unexpected 
variants in the crisis environment. However, the emergency response field is unlikely to 
abandon the practice of employing SOPs to guide emergency response. Therefore, a 
direct and practical solution to this dilemma is to integrate adaptive qualities into the SOP 
model, enabling it to better manage the variability of complex crises. The next chapter 
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IV. DEVELOPING THE ADAPTIVE SOP RESPONSE 
The only true wisdom is to know that you know nothing. 
—Socrates, 5th century, B.C. 
 
Don’t assume a damn thing. 
—Mayor Rudy Giuliani, 2002 
 
In their current form, standard operating procedures (SOPs) are too rigid to 
provide effective direction when a crisis exhibits complex characteristics. A reliance on 
rote, checklist guidance in lieu of innovative or adaptive solutions has the potential to 
hamper emergency response when the disaster reality diverges from the disaster 
projection. Bolton and Stolcis argue that standardized procedures are not effective “when 
‘wicked’ problems alter the decision-making environment because there is little time to 
react to changing conditions. These problems are wicked because they are poorly 
formulated and fall outside normal boundaries of decision-making.”105 The onset of 
spontaneous problems within a crisis is the hallmark of the prediction-defiant complex 
environment; in the jargon of complexity theory, a wicked problem is the manifestation 
of an emergent event during a disaster. Modern crisis SOPs lack the adaptability required 
to impart effective guidance for the emergent conditions found in a complex disaster. 
The previous chapters have identified the core deficiencies of the traditional SOP 
model in managing complex crises and contrasted them against the adaptive behaviors 
that led to success in the same environments. By understanding the nature of SOP failures 
and the comparative successes of adaptive crisis response, Homeland Security Enterprise 
(HSE) policy makers can renovate the traditional SOP model to effectively address its 
limitations in complex environments. This chapter presents two proposals to modify the 
SOP-driven approach to emergency response, prompting the identification of 
unanticipated elements within the crisis environment and promoting adaptive action.  
                                                 
105 Bolton and Stolcis, “Overcoming Failure,” 3. 
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A. CRISIS RESPONSE AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM 
The fundamental weakness in SOP guidance for complex crises is the application 
of static doctrine for managing highly variable emergencies. When Uhl-Bien, Marion, 
and McKelvey analyze the behavior of a complex adaptive system (CAS) in their work, 
“Complexity Leadership Theory,” they define a relevant distinction between 
administrative and adaptive leadership: “Administrative leadership refers to the actions of 
individuals and groups in formal managerial roles who plan and coordinate activities to 
accomplish organizationally-prescribed outcomes in an efficient and effective 
manner.”106 The traditional SOP model is an example of administrative leadership—a 
pre-staged plan of action supplied by leadership to accomplish a set of predicted goals 
within a predicted environment. Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey argue that 
administrative leadership fails to provide the necessary adaptability to manage 
environmental changes. They claim that complex environments require adaptive 
leadership, which is “an informal emergent dynamic that occurs among interactive agents 
… and is not an act of authority.”107 When applied to a complex crisis environment, the 
analysis tendered by Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey suggests that emergency response 
must function as a CAS, following a course dictated by a dynamic interaction with the 
disaster environment rather than by bureaucratic protocols prescribed by a remote 
authority. 
The application of CAS principles is particularly relevant to emergency response 
in a complex environment. Bruce MacLannen states, “Many complex systems are 
adaptive in that they respond to their environments and alter their behavior in such a way 
that they can maintain or improve their function, or so that they can ‘survive’ (that is, 
continue to persist as organized systems).”108 Additionally, Holland describes a CAS as 
having the ability to learn about the environment at a local level, thereby allowing 
adaptive aggregate behavior to emerge.109 This insight into the structure and purpose of a 
                                                 
106 Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory,” 305. 
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108 MacLennan, “Evolutionary Psychology,” 172. 
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CAS sheds direct light on the necessary evolution of the modern crisis SOP. Emergency 
responders must behave as interacting agents within a CAS, adapting to the spontaneity 
of the complex setting to effectively mitigate the emergency and—literally—survive the 
crisis environment. 
Modern emergency response must evolve away from reliance on static, pre-
arranged instructions and embrace the paradigm of a CAS. Louise Comfort et al. describe 
the essential nature of a CAS as “the spontaneous reallocation of energy and action to 
achieve a collective goal in a changing environment … [wherein] organizations adapt 
their performance to meet unexpected needs.”110 The ability to engage in flexible, 
dynamic responses to unexpected deviations ensures the effectiveness of the interacting 
agents within a complex system, a point of the highest possible relevance in navigating 
the wicked problems of a complex disaster event. Therefore, an adaptable SOP must 
promote the concepts of adaptive leadership and cultivate the behavior of a CAS among 
emergency responders. Proposals for an adaptive redesign of the crisis SOP model must 
be more than concrete sets of instructions; they must serve as decision support systems 
that guide crisis professionals to interact with the disaster setting like agents within a 
CAS. 
B. THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
The Socratic method of inquiry, sometimes referred to as the dialectic method, is 
a cognitive process intended to stimulate critical thinking and comprehension through a 
dialogue of questions and answers. Complexity scholars Richard Paul and Linda Elder 
describe the basis for the Socratic method as an educational platform that stimulates high-
level comprehension rather than simple rote learning: “Recognize that all thoughts 
presuppose an information base. Assume that you do not fully understand the thought 
until you understand the background information that supports or informs it.”111 
Educational researchers emphasize that this technique challenges potentially erroneous 
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assumptions and prevents a bias toward any single, correct answer.112 The Socratic 
method emphasizes that the initial information or analysis upon which an individual 
relies is neither stable nor reliable in the long-run; an individual achieves genuine 
comprehension by challenging initial conceptions with new ideas and empirical 
observations. 
The principal concept of the Socratic method is that a student develops a more 
complete comprehension of the topic of instruction by asking and answering questions—
aptly named Socratic questioning—that are structured to expand the understanding of a 
topic. Education professors Ya-Ting Yang, Timothy Newby, and Robert Bill contend that 
this method promotes comprehension rather than memorization, which ultimately yields a 
more thorough understanding of the subject. “Instead of providing direct answers, the 
Socratic questioning approach stimulates students’ minds by continually probing into the 
subject with thought-stimulating questions.”113 This process depends on challenging 
initial presumptions through the acquisition of additional information on the topic. The 
Socratic method pursues the achievement of comprehension based on empirical 
knowledge, facilitating conclusions derived from an active, cognitive challenge and re-
assessment of the subject matter. Paul describes the taxonomy of the Socratic method of 
inquiry in Table 1.  
                                                 
112 Whiteley, “Using the Socratic Method.” 
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Table 1.   A Taxonomy of Socratic Questions114 
 Types of Questions Sample Questions 
1 Clarification Could you put that another way? 
2 Probing Assumptions What are you assuming? 
3 Probing Reasons and Evidence Why do you think that is true? 
4 Viewpoint and Perspectives What effect would that have? 
5 Probing Implications and Consequences Why is this issue important? 
6 Questions about Questions What does that mean? 
 
The Socratic method does not provide students with absolute answers; in fact, a 
professor using the Socratic method promotes the belief that there are no absolute truths. 
Whiteley states, “The Socratic approach is used to get one to re-examine what they 
believe; it is not an approach used to present absolute information.”115 Socratic 
instructors guide students to reach their own conclusions through the dialectic process, 
which intentionally extinguishes any pre-existing assumptions.116 Therefore, instructors 
using this approach do not directly impart knowledge to their students; they guide 
students’ cognitive efforts to keep their lines of questioning oriented toward the precepts 
of the Socratic method. Scholars refer to this educational practice as scaffolding, a term 
appropriately reminiscent of the structures that support and contain a construction work 
in progress. The instructor guides the students’ efforts in a manner that keeps the learning 
process consistent with the Socratic tradition. 
While many contemporary educators promote the Socratic method to teach the art 
of critical thinking, this approach has also garnered its share of criticism as an academic 
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technique. A prevailing argument against the Socratic approach to education is that the 
dialectic method puts timid or apprehensive students at a disadvantage as they are less 
capable of participating in an analytic debate and, therefore, less likely to benefit from the 
Socratic process.117 The ambiguous nature of Socratic questioning can also represent a 
challenge in applying the method in either the classroom or practical environments. 
Socratic practitioners learn to interrogate their environment to achieve genuine 
comprehension. However, they must determine which questions are useful, as the choice 
to pursue an unproductive inquiry wastes time and effort.118 In addition to arguments 
against its use in the classroom, critics also believe that the Socratic method promotes a 
groupthink atmosphere in which participants gravitate toward homogenized opinions and 
reject contrarian views. Ramon Aldag and Sally Fuller contend that the groupthink 
environment tends to produce flawed decisions in the absence of opposing arguments.119 
The Socratic method is a controversial process; practitioners require a genuine 
understanding of its methodology and purpose to successfully utilize its cognitive 
benefits. 
The employment of Socratic methodology extends beyond promoting pedagogical 
critical thinking. Its practices have a direct application to professions engaged in time-
sensitive problem solving. Irving Sigel contends that Socratic questioning improves an 
individual’s capacity for higher reasoning because the process triggers creative and 
abstract thinking.120 James Overholser makes a similar argument, suggesting “the content 
of most Socratic questions is designed to foster independent, rational problem 
solving.”121 The principles of a Socratic methodology engender effective and thorough 
assessments of an issue as well as a practical means to assess potential solutions through 
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the dialectic process. The core Socratic principle of disavowing assumptions and re-
assessing the subject matter against new ideas and observations is particularly relevant in 
dealing with complex environments. Paul and Elder contend, “Deep questions drive our 
thought underneath the surface of things, forcing us to deal with complexity. Questions of 
information force us to look at our sources of information as well as at the quality of our 
information. … Questions of assumption force us to examine what we are taking for 
granted.”122 Recalling the case studies of evolving, prediction-defiant complex crises, the 
Socratic method represents a uniquely suitable foundation to mitigate complexity in the 
modern disaster environment. 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: ADAPTIVE DESIGN PROPOSALS 
The Socratic method is a particularly relevant philosophy for emergency response 
in a complex crisis. Its emphasis on challenging assumptions and evaluating—and then 
re-evaluating—the problem prepares emergency responders to expect an evolving 
scenario. The Socratic philosophy strictly opposes dependence on assumptions, which 
can be the basis for ineffective decision-making in the crisis environment. The crisis case 
studies in Chapter III illustrated numerous occasions when response efforts weakened or 
failed due to erroneous or irrelevant expectations. 
The Socratic method promotes an active search for knowledge as a means to 
achieving thorough comprehension. As such, it is an ideal foundation to develop a 
dynamic process for comprehending and acting within a variable environment. The 
complex crisis defies prediction, so the crisis responder who relies on assumptions is less 
likely to succeed. Patrick Lagadec further clarifies this point: “The cardinal principle is 
this: not to strive to foresee the unforeseeable but to train ourselves to cope with it. Not to 
clarify, map and plan for every single surprise, but to train to be surprised.”123 Therefore, 
the crisis responder who expects an evolving scenario and regularly questions his 
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comprehension of the threat enhances his potential to mitigate undesirable outcomes from 
a complex event. 
As a foundation for adaptive crisis SOPs, Table 2 presents the aforementioned 
Socratic questions, modified for application in the emergency response field. 
Table 2.   A Taxonomy of Socratic Questions for the Crisis Environment124 
 Types of Questions Sample Questions 
1 Clarification How does new evidence or a new event relate 
to the crisis situation and response plan? 
2 Probing Assumptions How does new information change the initial 
expectations about the crisis? 
3 Probing Reasons and Evidence How will new information or a new event 
impact the crisis environment? 
4 Viewpoint and Perspectives How does the new evidence or event impact 
the response plan? 
5 Probing Implications and Consequences How should new information or a new event 
change the response plan? 
6 Questions about Questions How does this new information actually 
impact the crisis situation? 
 
These are the questions that an adaptive crisis responder should ask of the 
environment. This is the Socratic scaffolding that should demarcate his approach to a 
complex disaster environment. By applying the Socratic method to a complex disaster, 
emergency responders can ask questions to avoid erroneous, even lethal, assumptions and 
identify opportunities to adapt and innovate in their response actions. 
As explained in the analysis of complex versus complicated systems, the twenty-
first century is a changed environment, and its hyper-connected nature has irrevocably 
diminished the value of prediction-dependent SOP guidance in a crisis. However, the use 
of SOPs appears to be an indelible component of government procedures, even in 
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complex scenarios when their contribution is suspect. Lagadec suggests a practical way 
forward in facing this dilemma: “When the world mutates, the ruling theories and best 
practices become outmoded, and even lethal pitfalls. …Our cherished models, those that 
have been so meticulously built in the last decades, are increasingly less relevant as new 
horizons of risks and crises unfold.”125 The HSE is unlikely to abandon its reliance on 
SOP guidance, so its standardized process must evolve to manage complex disasters. 
1. Adaptive Design Proposal #1—Adaptability Prompts 
Can the standardized process that Frederick Winslow Taylor used to preempt 
deliberation and creativity on the assembly line evolve to promote critical thinking? How 
does the traditional, static SOP model become adaptive? The first design proposal 
answers these questions by recommending the integration of adaptability prompts into 
the SOP model. These prompts are instructional steps added into an existing SOP 
checklist to guide responding officers in a complex scenario. This adaptive design 
proposal helps the emergency responder quickly identify unanticipated changes in the 
scenario and evaluate how these changes should modify the crisis response. Lagadec and 
Topper argue that crisis responders must learn to expect surprises in complex emergency 
scenarios and plan to revise response actions accordingly. They further contend that the 
paradigm shift from traditional, rote crisis response to dynamic emergency management 
requires modifying institutional design.126 Lagadec clarifies the need for changing the 
methodology behind modern crisis response: “When the pace, the scope and the nature of 
the terrain thus depart so abruptly from accepted blueprints, our visions, our initiatives 
and our tools rapidly fall apart. We must rebuild them, and do so urgently.”127 
Adaptability prompts are necessary improvements to one of the traditional tools for crisis 
response—a calculated upgrade to urge awareness of complexity in the field and to 
promote adaptable behavior. 
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Adaptability prompts are based on Socratic questioning and intended to stimulate 
critical thinking. The Socratic method opposes absolute answers and promotes an 
evaluative (and re-evaluative) process for digesting a problem. The adaptive SOP design 
relies on those same principles to encourage crisis responders to regularly evaluate the 
crisis environment and adapt their behavior appropriately to the needs of the moment. By 
incorporating these concepts into the decision process, emergency responders can more 
effectively manage evolving emergencies. 
By modifying existing crisis SOPs with the adaptability prompt concept, the 
guidance provided to emergency responders promotes an expectation that the crisis 
scenario will change and their actions in the field should adapt, matching emergent 
behavior to the emergent environment. To illustrate the proposal, Figure 4 presents the 
police SOP for active shooters introduced in Chapter II, modified to incorporate 
adaptability prompts, which are highlighted in yellow. 
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Figure 4.  Active Shooter SOP with Adaptability Prompts128 
The incorporation of adaptability prompts into the SOP structure may help crisis 
professionals more effectively manage complex emergencies. The SOP modifications 
make the expectation of change a core theme in every emergency response. Even more 
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importantly, the prompts compel the emergency responder to adjust his operational plan 
to counter the developments in the scenario. The inclusion of adaptability prompts may 
help integrate complexity awareness and adaptive action into the emergency response 
field, which would re-shape the traditional SOP model into a more effective tool for 
managing complex crises. 
2. Adaptive Design Proposal #2—The Crisis Co-pilot 
An essential element for the success of an adaptive SOP is the emergency 
responder’s ability to think quickly and critically as well as act effectively within a 
complex scenario. The crisis professional must challenge assumptions and identify 
deviations in the emergency event before taking action. Therefore, it is critical that 
excessive deliberation or “paralysis by analysis” does not inhibit or delay timely action in 
the crisis environment.129 The obligatory component of critical thinking in this adaptive 
design proposal should never hinder emergency response; it should only enhance and 
refine the emergency responder’s efforts. 
As previously mentioned, teachers of the Socratic method provide scaffolding for 
their students’ cognitive processes. Whiteley clarifies the purpose of scaffolding: “As the 
student begins to swerve off course or hits a brick wall, the role of the instructor is to 
direct the student in the right direction, but without providing the answers.”130 Crisis 
professionals would benefit from similar assistance to keep their cognitive process 
consistent with the Socratic method while progressing toward timely and adaptive 
response actions during a complex emergency. 
Lagadec and Topper also recommend the provision of cognitive assistance during 
an emergency. They developed the concept of a crisis assistance group to aid in the 
detection of unexpected elements within a complex crisis. They describe this support unit 
as a rapid reflection force whose purpose is “to help the leader to grasp and confront 
issues raised by unconventional situations. It does so by developing unconventional 
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responses when usual toolkits and references turn out to be irrelevant, or indeed 
dangerous.”131 Lagadec and Topper’s concept suggests that leading emergency response 
actions in the field while simultaneously evaluating (and re-evaluating) the crisis 
environment and operational plan is a task that exceeds the capacity of a single crisis 
professional. 
Lagadec describes the emergency responder as a “crisis pilot” who navigates the 
unexpected to mitigate a complex disaster.132 In deference to Lagadec’s work on 
emergency management in complex environments, the second adaptive design proposal 
recommends instituting a crisis co-pilot. This concept synthesizes elements of the 
Socratic method’s scaffolding as well as Lagadec and Topper’s rapid reflection force to 
create a professional role within the emergency response field that supports a primary 
emergency responder—the crisis pilot—in an advisory capacity. The crisis co-pilot 
assists the lead emergency responder in adhering to the Socratic tenets recommended by 
the adaptability prompts. His primary function is to remind the lead emergency responder 
to (1) question expectations in the crisis scenario, (2) consider the impact of unpredicted 
deviations, and (3) conceive adaptive modifications to the operational plan in order to 
adapt to the unexpected. 
To visualize the role of a crisis co-pilot, consider the hypothetical impact it could 
have made on September 11, 2001, when the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
initially detected a problem with American Airlines Flight 11, the first plane hijacked 
during the event. The initial air traffic controller (ATC) had a number of SOP-driven 
duties to perform while assessing the anomalous flight, which was not an ideal moment 
to deliberate over potentially erroneous assumptions. In this scenario, the ATC would 
identify the irregular—and potentially threatening—situation to an FAA staff member 
trained to serve as a crisis co-pilot. The lead controller would continue to manage the 
requisite SOP duties while the crisis co-pilot joins the management process, observing 
the unfolding situation, and providing advice that prompts critical thinking and adaptive 
behavior. 
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Imagine the crisis co-pilot periodically posing the questions suggested by the 
adaptability prompts to the principal emergency responder: Has new information become 
available since the initial baseline expectations? How should other threats or additional 
information affect tactics? In this theoretical version of the 9/11 attacks, the crisis co-
pilot’s advice guides the lead controller to challenge his initial assumptions and 
potentially recognize the unexpected nature of the attack earlier. The crisis co-pilot’s role 
is not intended to predict the unexpected. His role is to scaffold the principal emergency 
responder’s cognitive process within the framework of the adaptability prompts concept, 
avoiding myopic biases that develop from static assumptions about the crisis event and 
prediction-dependent SOP guidance. 
The implementation of the adaptability prompts concept and the crisis co-pilot 
role is intended to induce critical changes in the emergency management paradigm, 
allowing responders to more effectively manage complex events. Both adaptive design 
proposals will compel crisis professionals to assess an evolving emergency and anticipate 
the need for adaptive countermeasures. While the implementation of either design will 
enhance the emergency response during a complex event, emergency responders would 
ideally employ them together in order to reinforce their impact on the emergency 
response paradigm. 
D. IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY FOR THE ADAPTIVE DESIGN 
PROPOSALS 
This thesis has demonstrated that SOP guidance does not sufficiently account for 
the presence of complexity in the modern crisis environment. Lagadec contends, “The 
strategic landscape has mutated, the conventional tactics and interpretations no longer 
work and are even counterproductive. We must … construct new frameworks for 
understanding and coping with reality.”133 Leaders within the HSE need to apply the 
lessons taught by today’s mega-crises to reform the foundations of modern emergency 
response. The HSE should implement policy changes that promote adaptability and 
innovation to mitigate complex disasters. 
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To introduce these institutional changes, policy makers must first garner 
organizational sponsorship for the new proposal. Governance professors Arjen Boin and 
Paul ’t Hart argue that policy makers should identify the “reform imperative … to build 
support for nonincremental reform, [and] portray crises as the result of flaws in the 
existing institutional order.”134 In order to successfully change the fundamental 
orientation of emergency management from prediction-dependent response to analytic, 
innovative response, policy makers must first convince HSE leadership that previous 
failures in emergency response were the result of an outmoded methodology. The case 
studies and analysis provided in Chapter III exemplify the manner in which policy 
makers can demonstrate the failure of prediction-dependent SOPs and the successes of 
adaptive behavior in managing complex disasters. This compelling analysis implies that 
the failure to make these proposed policy changes risks future calamities. If HSE leaders 
genuinely comprehend both the conceptual value of these policy proposals as well as the 
implied threat of ignoring the associated analysis (in terms of avoidable future 
catastrophes), it seems reasonable that they would approve these adaptive design 
proposals. 
After securing executive approval for the policy proposal, HSE policy makers 
need to convert the adaptive design concepts into a working reality. The adaptability 
prompts and the advisory role of a crisis co-pilot are uncomplicated upgrades to an HSE 
agency’s crisis response paradigm. However, they still require emergency responders to 
learn and practice the procedural changes. Emergency response agencies can introduce 
these new procedures into their standard, periodic re-certification training. 
The general training process should begin with classroom instruction that clarifies 
the purpose of the adaptive SOP modifications and explains the additional steps and the 
function of the crisis co-pilot. After the classroom portion of the training, operators 
should engage in practical exercises to hone these new techniques into operational 
readiness. Once the operators have achieved proficiency with the adaptive modifications, 
there should be an opportunity to provide feedback to HSE leadership regarding the 
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effectiveness of the training techniques and the successes or challenges of the adaptive 
designs in the field. As it is unlikely that the first iteration of this policy will be perfect, 
HSE leadership should anticipate refining the training and operational process to make 
the adaptive design proposals successful in the field. 
HSE policy makers can immediately institute an elementary form of the crisis co-
pilot by assigning personnel to pose adaptability prompts during an emergency (or 
training) scenario. Depending on the nature of the agency, its leadership may choose to 
situate this role within a department that already serves a communications function such 
as a police radio dispatch unit. In fact, several police agencies in the United States have 
expanded the responsibilities of their communications personnel to incorporate a tactical 
component, establishing an operational link between the communications center and 
officers responding to an event. The advisory role of the crisis co-pilot would be a natural 
fit for a communications-centric police professional. 
Regardless of their station in the implementing agency, personnel serving as crisis 
co-pilots would greatly benefit from training in the Socratic method. There are numerous 
advanced training opportunities available through universities, non-profit organizations, 
and private industry that teach Socratic techniques to foster critical thinking. For 
example, Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Transatlantic Relations has sponsored 
seminars on strategies for managing complex crises.135 In addition, Socratic Seminars 
International delivers professional workshops in the Socratic method. Ideally, emergency 
response personnel serving in the ad hoc role of crisis co-pilot would attend recurring 
training to enhance their ability to provide adaptive scaffolding to the crisis professionals 
they assist in the field. 
Sociologist Edgar Morin claims, “Nothing is more difficult than modifying a 
cornerstone concept.”136 Bearing in mind the implied challenge in adjusting institutional 
procedures, the design proposals for integrating adaptability into the emergency response 
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paradigm are deliberately straightforward and intuitively simple. Adaptability prompts 
are modest adjustments to a pre-existing crisis SOP, and while the crisis co-pilot role 
would benefit from specialized training, emergency response agencies can institute its ad 
hoc advisory function with very basic instruction. In short, the adaptive designs are 
simple improvements to the emergency response tool box, engineered for quick and 
uncomplicated implementation in the field. By integrating adaptability into emergency 
response, the HSE prepares its professionals to effectively manage complex disasters and, 
in doing so, better protect their communities. 
When considering a new venture like the adaptive design proposals, HSE policy 
makers must assess the project’s potential merits. The following chapter presents the 
results of a computer simulation model devised to illustrate the potential benefits of 
employing the adaptive design proposals in a crisis environment. 
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V. EVALUATING THE ADAPTIVE DESIGN PROPOSALS 
When considering any new project, government agencies must attempt to 
accurately assess its merits. Whether deliberating over a procurement request or a law-
enforcement field operation, decision makers are expected to evaluate its prospective 
benefits and likelihood of success before committing personnel and resources.137 This 
process is challenging as it requires an estimation of a proposal’s potential. The evaluator 
must play the role of fortuneteller to produce an analysis of future performance. 
Fortunately, modern computing advancements have improved the forecasting 
powers of government leaders. Decision makers within the Homeland Security Enterprise 
(HSE) are now able to execute a proposed decision within a virtual environment, 
allowing various factors to interact and influence the result without risking actual 
government assets or personnel. David Simeone and Yehuda Kalay claim that 
simulations “allow [proposal] designers to evaluate … performance and, if necessary, to 
intervene to solve emergent usability problems, critical points and inconsistencies.”138 
Simulated environments allow researchers to quantify the relevance and impact of 
various risk factors on the proposed project. As a decision support tool, multi-agent 
system (MAS) modeling is particularly useful for assessing the merits of a proposed 
action.    
A. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM SIMULATION AS A DECISION SUPPORT 
TOOL 
MAS simulations are frameworks that approximate human decisions within a 
virtual system to identify the best means for achieving a desired outcome. Xiaoshan Pan 
et al. describe this scientific methodology as “an artificial environment populated with 
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autonomous agents, which are capable of interacting with each other.”139 The 
overarching purpose of the MAS framework is to simulate individual human decision 
processes as well as to depict emergent patterns of individuals or factors interacting 
within the system.140 Individuals can apply this method of simulating and studying 
human behavior to any type of scenario, from the financial impact of acquiring a new 
vendor to the police response to an active shooter event. 
By following a set of behavioral rules, computer simulations can approximate 
human cognitive processes. These rules identify possible choices in each moment of 
virtual interaction and ultimately define the nature and quality of the virtual environment. 
If the simulation does not accurately represent the choices appropriate to the scenario, the 
exercise will inaccurately represent reality. As J. Doyne Farmer and Duncan Foley state, 
“The major challenge lies in specifying how the agents behave and, in particular, in 
choosing the rules they use to make decisions. In many cases this is still done by common 
sense and guesswork, which is only sometimes sufficient to mimic real behaviour.”141 
Susan Sanchez defines the need for randomization in the virtual environment as “a 
probabilistic guard against the possibility of unknown, hidden sources of bias surfacing to 
create problems with your data.”142 The computer simulation assigns probabilities that 
agents in the scenario will make specific choices and then effectively rolls a set of virtual 
dice to determine the outcome. By purposefully incorporating randomness into the 
simulation, model designers can produce statistically relevant results and a convincing 
imitation of reality. 
The number of choices available in each possible interaction in the virtual 
environment defines the simulation’s relative resolution, or the degree of its resemblance 
to the real world. Arnold Buss and Darryl Ahner explain that a high-resolution simulation 
                                                 
139 Xiaoshan Pan et al., “A Multi-agent Based Framework for the Simulation of Human and Social 
Behaviors during Emergency Evacuations,” AI & Society 22, no. 2 (2007): 114, doi: 10.1007/s00146-007-
0126-1. 
140 Ibid. 
141 J. Doyne Farmer and Duncan Foley, “The Economy Needs Agent-Based Modelling,” Nature 460, 
no. 7256 (2009): 686, doi: 10.1038/460685a. 
142 Sanchez, “Work Smarter,” 69. 
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model contains a significant number of nuanced possibilities within the virtual 
environment, simulating “every element and entity with many attributes … to model the 
dynamics and interactions to a very fine degree.”143 A high level of nuance creates a 
more realistic environment, but the computing power required to manage all the 
interconnected possibilities can quickly outpace the capacity of the computer running the 
simulation.144 For this reason, decision makers frequently employ low-resolution 
simulation models when considering a proposed project. The low-resolution model does 
not incorporate the same level of detail, but users can run these simulations and analyze 
the results in a reasonably short period of time and still deliver information that is 
relevant to government decision makers. 
Building an accurate simulation not only requires the identification of appropriate 
choices within the MAS framework but also the assignment of realistic probabilities for 
these options to take place. MAS simulations define the various decision probabilities 
based on a range of disciplines, which may include sociology, cognitive psychology, 
game theory, or observational data.145 The methodology behind assigning quantitative 
probabilities to qualitative—sometimes illogical—decision processes is a product of 
social theories, observed data, and educated guesses, often described by social scientists 
as a mixture of science and art.146 
B. THE HEURISTIC 9/11 SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
There is a variety of MAS simulation model types, each one oriented to different 
environments, interacting agents, and logic frameworks. This thesis presents a heuristic 
MAS simulation that relies on historical data from the September 11 attacks to illustrate 
the potential value of the adaptive standard operating procedure (SOP) designs. Heuristic 
simulation models are low-resolution, virtual systems based on observed data.147 
                                                 
143 Buss and Ahner, “Dynamic Allocation of Fires and Sensors,” 1358. 
144 Ibid. 




Researchers convert observational data into “logic rules,” or heuristics, which govern the 
decisions of interacting agents within the system. 
To illustrate the potential benefit of the adaptive design proposals presented in 
Chapter IV, I designed and executed a heuristic MAS simulation based on the crisis 
response decisions made at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) on the morning of September 11, 
2001.148 I constructed the simulation using Northrop Grumman’s Pythagoras simulation 
suite (version 2.1), an off-the-shelf virtual environment designed to test a wide variety of 
scenarios, from armed combat to propaganda influences on a community.149 The logic 
rules governing the behavior of the virtual agents are based on empirical observations 
taken from official accounts of the September 11 attacks and on a professional 
assessment of the FAA response paradigm to aviation anomalies in 2001, as provided by 
FAA Air Traffic Security Coordinator Douglas Gould. I synthesized Mr. Gould’s 
assessment of the FAA threat response paradigm (circa 2001) into Table 3. 
  
                                                 
148 The NPS Operations Research Department’s Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs 
(SEED) Center provided significant support in the design and execution of this experiment. 
149 Zoe Henscheid, Donna Middleton, and Edmund Bitinas, “Pythagoras: An Agent-Based Simulation 
Environment,” Scythe 1, no. 1 (2005): 40–44. 
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Table 3.   FAA Threat Response to Aviation Anomalies (circa 2001) 
Aviation Anomalous Event Impact on Threat Detection 
Commercial aircraft fails to make a scheduled 
altitude change 
25% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response 
Commercial aircraft makes an unexpected 
altitude change 
50% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response 
Commercial aircraft’s transponder stops 
transmitting 
50% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response 
Commercial aircraft fails to respond to 
FAA communication 
50% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response 
FAA intercepts suspicious transmissions from 
aircraft 
50% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response 
FAA receives messages from crew/passengers 
suggestive of violence and/or hijackers 
onboard 
75% more likely to identify a threat and 
initiate a crisis response 
 
In order to provide meaningful and reliable data, the experiment incorporated two 
standard practices for simulations. First, I replicated the model a statistically sufficient 
number of times for each variation of initial threat detection probability. Sanchez 
explains the statistical need for replicated simulations as “a way to gain enough data to 
achieve narrow confidence intervals [or higher levels of precision] and powerful 
hypothesis tests, or for graphical methods to reveal the important characteristics of your 
simulation model.”150 Second, I ran the model stochastically to represent the uncertainty 
of the real world.151 The Pythagoras simulation suite automatically engineers stochastic 
or random results through the use of probabilities to govern virtual agent behavior. In 
addition, I used non-zero tolerances associated with several of the Pythagoras parameters 
to allow additional variance within the virtual dice rolls that determine the outcome of 
agent interactions. A tolerance in Pythagoras represents the “plus or minus” quantity 
associated with a numerical value. Thus, if the programmed probability of an event 
                                                 
150 Sanchez, “Work Smarter,” 69. 
151 A stochastic simulation implies the integration of randomness or a random distribution of results. 
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occurring is 50 percent with a tolerance of .05, the actual probability that event will occur 
will vary between 45 percent and 55 percent for each run of that simulation. The 
integration of randomness into the virtual environment produces a variability among 
possible outcomes that effectively mimics real life. 
1. The 9/11 Control Experiment 
The initial phase of the experiment, the control phase, simulated the 
FAA/NORAD decisions as they actually happened on the morning of September 11. To 
prepare the simulation design, I used empirical data to map out the timing and flow of the 
events that took place on September 11 (see Figure 5).152 Relying on this information, I 
constructed the logic rules that govern the interactions between virtual agents and with 
the specific aviation anomalies that occurred during the event. The Pythagoras software 
refers to these interactions as triggers. 
                                                 
152 Data obtained from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report. 
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Figure 5.  Simulation Muscle Movements 
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For the control simulation, the FAA Boston Air Traffic Controller (ATC Boston) 
virtual agent—representing the actual ATC who dealt with American Airlines Flight 
11—is defined as part of the red team. The experiment begins at time step 0, the analogue 
to 8:14 a.m. (EST) when Flight 11 made an unscheduled altitude change. This incident 
was the first observed aviation anomaly related to Flight 11 and the initial indicator of the 
September 11 attacks. The simulation progresses through incremental time steps, each 
representing one minute of actual time. The experiment allows the ATC Boston virtual 
agent one opportunity per time step to detect the Flight 11 virtual agent as a threat. 
During the initial time steps, the logic rules allow the ATC Boston agent a 50 
percent chance of detecting Flight 11 as a threat. This detection probability is a 
programmed behavioral rule based on the FAA’s standardized response (circa 2001) 
when a commercial airplane makes an unscheduled altitude change. At time step 7, or 
8:21 a.m., the probability of detecting Flight 11 as a threat increases with the subsequent 
aviation anomaly of Flight 11’s transponder shutting down. At time step 10, or 8:24 a.m., 
the probability of detecting Flight 11 as a threat increases again with the aviation 
anomaly of suspicious transmissions received from Flight 11. 
The actual FAA Boston ATC took approximately 11 minutes to identify Flight 11 
as a threat and elevate the issue to his supervisor. The simulation approximates that result 
by assigning the ATC Boston agent an initial 50 percent chance of detecting the Flight 11 
agent, and then increases this probability with each additional aviation anomaly. Each 
time the ATC Boston agent successfully detects Flight 11 as a threat within the 
simulation, he becomes “more convinced” of Flight 11’s threat, which the simulation 
represents by incrementally changing his team color to become less red and more green. 
Once the agent’s color turns more than 50 percent green, the simulation considers 
him sufficiently convinced that Flight 11 is a threat. As illustrated in Figure 6, the 
simulation then re-codes the agent’s marker as an “X” and directs him toward the next 
decision maker in the chain of command. 
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Figure 6.  Initial Stage of 9/11 Simulation 
At this point in the simulation, the first agent interacts with the next according to a 
new set of behavioral rules. In this case, the green agent fires a virtual green paintball at 
the next agent in the chain of command, which simulates the process of convincing him 
that Flight 11 is a threat. The concept of persuading a simulation agent via hits from a 
virtual paintball gun is a technique called surrogation; the paintball hit is a surrogate for a 
successful persuasion attempt by another agent in the model. The moment when the 
second agent is hit enough times to turn more than 50 percent green—the surrogate for 
becoming sufficiently convinced of the Flight 11 threat—the simulation rules direct him 
toward the next agent in the chain of command (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.  Interim Stage of 9/11 Simulation 
The process continues until the final agent becomes sufficiently convinced and 
“attacks” the Flight 11 agent with virtual paintballs, which is the surrogate for NORAD’s 
decision to launch intercept fighters (Figure 8). This actual decision took place at 8:46 
a.m. on September 11, 2001, analogous to time step 32. 
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Figure 8.  Final Stage of 9/11 Simulation 
To obtain credible results from the control experiment, I ran the stochastic 
simulation 100 times. Figure 9 displays the results of the control experiment. The 
graphical display on the left side of Figure 9 illustrates the range of results from the 100 
iterations. The histogram indicates that the distribution of experimental data 
approximates a normal distribution, which presents as a bell-shaped curve. The 
experimental data yielded a mean time of completion at time step 30, or 8:44 a.m. This 
result means that NORAD launched the alert fighters two time steps, or two minutes, 
faster in the simulation environment than during the actual event on September 11. The 
summary statistics yielded a standard deviation of 5.7, denoting that in the majority of 
iterations, the launch order was issued within six minutes on either side of the 8:44 a.m. 
average time.153 NORAD actually ordered the launch at 8:46 a.m., the equivalent to time 
                                                 
153 A principal characteristic of a normal (or Gaussian) distribution of data is that approximately 68 
percent of all observations fall within one standard deviation of the mean. Wayne LaMorte, “The Normal 
Distribution: A Probability Model for a Continuous Outcome,” Boston University School of Public Health, 
July 24, 2016, http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/mph-modules/bs/bs704_probability/bs704_ 
probability8.html. 
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step 32, which falls within one standard deviation of the mean of the experiment. This 
outcome verifies that the control experiment is a reasonable and plausible simulation of 
the September 11 events. 
 
Figure 9.  Distributions from the Control Simulation Experiment 
2. The Adaptive SOP Enhancement Experiment 
After testing the simulation environment to verify that its logic rules produced 
credible results, I designed an experiment to evaluate whether an adaptive SOP could 
have improved the September 11 crisis response. To obtain a demonstrable range of 
results, I incrementally increased the ATC Boston agent’s initial chance to identify Flight 
11 as a threat by 5 percent and ran the simulation 100 times at each 5 percent increment. 
The increase in initial detection probability for the ATC Boston virtual agent 
approximates the hypothetical improvement facilitated by the adaptive design proposals. 
The purpose of modifying the initial detection probability and running the 
experiment at each increment was to identify how much of an increase in the agent’s 
ability to detect an unexpected threat is required to improve the outcome of the scenario. 
If the simulation results suggest the proposed SOP re-design must produce substantial 
improvements to significantly change the scenario outcome, the adaptive design 
proposals may not be worth the effort. Conversely, if the simulation results demonstrate 
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that the SOP re-design only needs to yield a modest increase in the agent’s ability to 
significantly improve the outcome, decision makers should be more convinced of the 
merits associated with implementing the adaptive design proposals. The second 
experiment allows decision makers to visualize the potential benefits of implementing the 
adaptive design proposals. 
I determined that the goal of this experiment—the point at which the adaptive 
design proposals achieve a meaningful improvement in the scenario outcome—was to 
prompt the order to launch alert fighters in time to intercept United Airlines Flight 175. 
Flight 175 was the second airliner to strike the World Trade Center, hitting the South 
Tower at 9:03 a.m. The alert fighters require 23 minutes from the launch order to travel 
150 miles to New York City.154 Considering these factors, the virtual NORAD needs to 
order the launch at 8:37 a.m. for the alert fighters to be in the vicinity of New York City 
by 9:00 a.m., allowing a three-minute window of opportunity for the military aircraft to 
intercept Flight 175 before it strikes the South Tower. In simulation terms, the goal of the 
experiment is to identify the percentage of improvement in the ATC Boston virtual 
agent’s threat-detection ability required to complete the simulation by time step 23. After 
running the simulation 100 times for each incremental increase in the ATC Boston 
agent’s detection ability, I analyzed the data distribution from each series. As presented 
in the next section, the graphical representation of the results allowed a straightforward 
comparison of the experimental data against the stated goal of the simulation. 
C. EXPERIMENT CONCLUSIONS 
Figure 10 displays the distribution of experimental data across all 20 increments 
of the ATC Boston agent’s percent improvement in initial threat detection (x-axis). The 
black horizontal line at time step 32, or 8:46 a.m., represents the time that NORAD 
actually gave the launch order on September 11. The green horizontal line represents the 
goal of the experiment, to obtain a launch order by time step 23, or 8:37 a.m. The vertical 
dots represent the range of results for each incremental simulation series. The red 
brackets represent the results that fall within one standard deviation of the mean for each 
                                                 
154 Data obtained National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report. 
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case, and the blue line connects the mean result for each series of percent improvement in 
detection ability. 
 
Figure 10.  Distributions from the Adaptive SOP Enhancement Simulation 
Experiment 
The graphical display of the experiment illustrates that the use of adaptive SOPs 
could significantly decrease reaction time with only a modest improvement in the ATC 
Boston’s initial threat detection ability. As indicated within the table, the goal of 
completing the simulation by time step 23 falls within one standard deviation of the mean 
at the 25 percent increment. This outcome indicates that if the adaptive SOP response 
yielded a 25 percent improvement in threat detection, then it is statistically feasible that 
the alert fighters could have intercepted Flight 175. The simulation results demonstrate 
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that the adaptive design proposals could theoretically yield a reasonable and significant 
benefit to the field of crisis response. Therefore, this experiment supports the argument 
for implementing the adaptive design proposals. 
The adaptive SOP enhancement experiment was an exercise in counterfactual 
history intended to portray the prospective value of the adaptive design proposals. MAS 
simulation experiments cannot represent every nuance in human behavior or unpredicted 
influence in a complex system, so the experiment conclusions must appear as “if/then” 
statements rather than concrete assertions. Computer simulations are a product of 
theories, data, and educated guesses—they do not trade in absolutes. However, while 
these results are only hypothetical, they do effectively promote the adaptive design 
proposals by quantifying and visualizing their potential enhancements to the HSE 
emergency response paradigm. 
The following conclusion chapter summarizes the thesis’ exploration of 
complexity theory and SOPs, the case study analysis of recent complex mega-crises, the 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When responding to an emergency, crisis professionals must rely on their 
training, equipment, and experience, and act in accordance with standard operating 
procedures (SOPs). Ideally, the SOP checklist ensures consistent and successful 
performance by anticipating the operating environment and recommending appropriate 
actions. So long as the actual event adheres to the prediction, the SOP can assist 
responders who need to make effective choices in the field. Dilemmas arise when rapidly 
developing events diverge from expectation and the SOP guidance becomes less useful or 
even hampers response efforts. 
This thesis tackled the problem of applying prediction-dependent SOPs in the 
complex twenty-first century crisis environment. Technological advancements in the 
digital age allow human beings to exert near-real time influence on each other and their 
environment. Sociologists who describe this hyper-connected world as a complex system 
assert that one of its quintessential characteristics is unpredictability. Modern crises also 
demonstrate elements of complexity, making agent interactions and emergent behavior 
difficult to anticipate. Unfortunately, while the characteristics of modern crises have 
evolved, the SOPs used to manage them have not. 
Because complexity is essentially unpredictable, traditional SOPs become less 
effective in complex emergencies. Reliance on conditioned, checklist instructions instead 
of innovative, adaptive solutions can cripple emergency response when the actual 
outcome does not align with the anticipated course of the disaster. This is a challenge that 
hampers today’s emergency responders whenever the crises diverge from expectations; 
the more significant the disaster, the more complex its behavior. 
This thesis presented analysis of the September 11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and 
the Fukushima-Dai’ichi nuclear incident. These case studies illuminated the inadequacies 
of the traditional SOP model in complex disasters and offered adaptive design proposals 
to address this critical vulnerability. Complex mega-crises are worst-case scenarios for 
the misapplication of prediction-dependent SOPs in an unpredictable environment. The 
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analysis and discussion presented in the case studies consistently found that SOP-driven 
responses were ineffective when the operational setting varied from expectations. The 
thesis also demonstrated that when crisis responses embraced adaptable, innovative 
solutions, they frequently yielded successful results despite the less predictable 
operational setting. The central conclusion from the case study analysis was that the 
fundamental unpredictability of complex emergencies demands an adaptable response 
approach that can change as the disaster itself changes. 
Since traditional SOPs are too inflexible to impart effective direction in complex 
emergencies, the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) needs a method to incorporate 
adaptive, innovative qualities into its crisis response. This thesis began by asking the 
question: How can we integrate adaptability into SOPs? To develop answers to that 
central question, the work depended on current research in complex adaptive systems 
(CAS) theory, Lagadec’s philosophical exploration of complex crises, and a practical 
application of the Socratic method to the emergency response standard. Based on the 
examination of this material, the thesis synthesized two prototype solutions that 
addressed the need for flexibility and innovation while allowing for the traditional use of 
SOP guidance in crisis response. 
First, the work recommended a modification of pre-existing crisis SOPs to 
integrate adaptability prompts that stimulate critical thinking during an emergency. These 
modest changes to an HSE agency’s SOP should help responders identify the 
unanticipated behavior of a complex emergency. Even more importantly, adaptability 
prompts compel the crisis professional to adjust the response plan to account for new 
information and the evolving needs of the moment. The adaptability prompt concept 
makes anticipating potential divergence from the expected event a principal theme for 
every emergency response. 
The second adaptive design proposal makes a concerted effort to foster critical 
thinking within the crisis environment. The thesis recommends the creation of an ad hoc 
crisis advisory role, a crisis co-pilot, to help an emergency lead-responder employ 
Socratic reasoning in the field. The primary purpose of the crisis co-pilot is not to predict 
the unexpected, but to encourage the emergency lead-responder to challenge 
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assumptions, anticipate the unexpected, and modify operational plans to manage the 
evolving crisis. The crisis co-pilot should help prevent myopic biases that can develop 
from static assumptions about the emergency. 
Implementing institutional changes within the emergency response field is a 
challenging prospect. Agencies within the HSE have unique traditions and approaches to 
the management of their varying responsibilities. For this reason, the solutions proposed 
within this thesis are intentionally straightforward and widely applicable. In particular, 
the changes recommended to integrate adaptability into the HSE emergency response 
paradigm require minimal time and training. Simply stated, the adaptive design proposals 
are deliberately modest changes to the emergency responder’s tool box, devised for quick 
and uncomplicated implementation in the field. 
While ineffective SOPs do not presuppose the failure of emergency responders in 
every complex event—the quality of their experience and technology arguably 
overshadows the shortfalls of their rote guidelines—they remain a flawed yet fixable 
problem within the emergency response field. As such, this thesis proposed two 
executable methods to integrate adaptability into standardized emergency response. By 
incorporating adaptability prompts into crisis SOPs and instituting the role of a crisis co-
pilot, response agencies within the HSE can more effectively manage complex 
emergencies. A re-designed SOP model that is more agile will guide crisis professionals 
to embrace adaptation when events deviate from the expected. Emergency responders 
will benefit from a support structure that fosters critical thinking in field operations. By 
implementing these steps to integrate adaptability into emergency response, HSE policy 
makers can better prepare their personnel to manage complex disasters and, in doing so, 
better protect their communities. 
A. NEXT STEPS 
Where do these concepts find a home? Ideally, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) would help 
introduce the adaptive design proposals into the emergency response community. NPD is 
an organizational component of FEMA that “provides the doctrine, programs, and 
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resources to prepare the Nation to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to and recover from 
disasters while minimizing the loss of lives, infrastructure, and property.”155 The NPD 
mission encompasses all levels of government across a variety of emergency incidents. In 
particular, NPD’s National Preparedness Assessment Division (NPAD) is responsible for 
evaluating activities and innovations that promote all-hazards preparedness, and 
communicating these improvements across the U.S. emergency response community.156 
NPAD’s operational structure is designed to identify gaps in the national 
preparedness paradigm and assess possible solutions or enhancements. Of particular 
relevance, NPAD has established the Lessons Learned and Continuous Improvement 
Program (LLCIP) to promote “preparedness by identifying lessons learned and 
innovative practices, analyzing recurring trends, and sharing knowledge with the whole 
community.”157 This program has the unique capability to evaluate and develop new 
preparedness and response procedures for the emergency response field. As of 2015, the 
LLCIP archives its collected data at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Homeland Security 
Digital Library to allow centralized access for the entire HSE.158 Policy makers could 
leverage the LLCIP to assess the adaptive design proposals and develop them into 
procedural recommendations for governmental crisis response. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis is an initial step to understand and manage the practical impacts of 
complexity on the modern crisis environment. The research and analysis presented here 
indicate a significant vulnerability in contemporary emergency response that deserves 
continued study. In that regard, scholars should expand the case study analysis presented 
in Chapter III to examine additional instances of modern complex disasters with a 
                                                 
155 “National Preparedness Directorate,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, last updated 
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particular focus on the comparative results of predictive versus emergent crisis responses. 
The scope of this thesis did not allow for more expansive case study and analysis. 
However, supplementary evaluations of crisis SOPs and emergent response behavior in 
action may yield a better understanding of the dilemma created when crisis professionals 
apply predictive responses to unpredictable events. 
Further study is also warranted to explore the integration of adaptability within 
other areas of CAS research, particularly in the emerging field of intelligent technology. 
Louise Comfort et al. espouse the development of Interactive Intelligent Spatial 
Information Systems (IISIS), computerized information systems designed to interpret 
unfolding crises and recommend mitigation responses.159 The crisis analysis and 
recommendations produced by an IISIS would ideally account for the influences of 
complexity within the environment. By incorporating an expectation of less-predictable 
emergency events and the need for adaptive, innovative responses, an IISIS may provide 
more effective advice to crisis professionals in the same fashion that the adaptive design 
proposals may improve SOP guidance. 
Finally, the field of emergency response would benefit from directed research into 
a crisis professional’s dependence on decision support tools like an SOP checklist while 
under duress. As discussed in Chapter II, the works of Hales and Pronovost identify and 
explore human beings’ diminished ability to make rational decisions under significant 
pressure: “Human error is inevitable—particularly under stressful conditions. It has been 
demonstrated that levels of cognitive function are compromised as stress and fatigue level 
increase.”160 Understanding the need for decision support tools when operating in a high-
stress environment may identify additional ways to build adaptability into tomorrow’s 
crisis SOPs. 
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160 Hales and Pronovost, “The Checklist,” 231–235. 
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